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“I wish the rent was heaven sent.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Amid an extreme affordable housing crisis in 2017,2 the New York 
City Council passed the right to counsel, which guarantees an 
attorney to individuals facing eviction in Housing Court proceedings.3  
The right to counsel was fought for by a coalition of tenants and 
advocates determined to make Housing Court a fairer place and to 
increase the power of the tenant movement, which, at the time of this 
writing, stands poised to make major redistributive legal and policy 
gains for the first time since the 1970s.4  It was also supported by the 
 
 1. LANGSTON HUGHES, Little Lyric (of Great Importance), in THE COLLECTED 
POEMS OF LANGSTON HUGHES 226, 226 (1995). 
 2. The term “housing crisis” has been invoked repeatedly throughout the history 
of New York City. Arguably, the city has survived dozens of housing crises: the 
public health crisis of tenement housing, the post-World War II housing shortage, the 
wholesale destruction of neighborhoods through urban renewal, and widespread 
urban disinvestment in the 1970s and early 1980s, for example. As Madden and 
Marcuse note, “[f]or the oppressed, housing is always in crisis . . . . Housing crisis 
[are] not a result of the system breaking down, but of the system working as it 
intended.” David Madden & Peter Marcuse, The Permanent Housing Crisis, 
JACOBIN (Oct. 2, 2016), https://jacobinmag.com/2016/10/housing-crisis-rent-landlords-
homeless-affordability [https://perma.cc/L3ZZ-MFX6]. According to Madden and 
Marcuse, in the current iteration of the housing crisis, “[h]ouseholds are being 
squeezed by the cost of living. Homelessness is on the rise. Evictions and foreclosures 
are commonplace. Segregation and poverty, along with displacement and 
unaffordability, have become the hallmarks of today’s cities.” Id. New York City’s 
current affordable housing crisis is explored in the first Section of this Article. See 
infra Section IA. 
 3. The right to counsel, often characterized as “universal access,” is described 
fully in the second Section of this Article. See infra Section II.A. In essence, the right 
to counsel is a municipal law that guarantees all income-eligible tenants in New York 
City an attorney in eviction proceedings in Housing Court, and in some 
administrative proceedings. Abigail Savitch-Lew, City Tackles Roll-Out of Right to 
Counsel in Housing Court, CITY LIMITS (Jan. 17, 2018), 
https://citylimits.org/2018/01/17/city-tackles-roll-out-of-right-to-counsel-in-housing-
court/ [https://perma.cc/C3C8-VQH2]. The right to counsel is being phased in over a 
five-year period. Id. 
 4. On June 14, 2019, the New York State Legislature passed a sweeping rent 
regulation reform bill, the Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act of 2019. See 
S.B. 6458, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019). The new legislation made dozens of 
reforms to the Emergency Tenant Protections Act (which governs New York’s rent 
regulatory framework), as well as the state’s Real Property Actions and Proceedings 
Law (which sets standards for housing court proceedings). Id. Among the most 
significant changes were the elimination of high rent vacancy decontrol, the 
mechanism through which units could be removed from rent regulation, and the 
vacancy bonus, under which landlords could increase rents by 20% upon each 
vacancy. Id. at 1–2. These changes, alongside others limiting rent increases, 
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mayoral administration of Bill de Blasio,5 whose market-based 
housing policies have contributed to the current crisis.6  The 
divergence between the political and economic development visions 
of those who organized for the right to counsel and the de Blasio 
administration signals that the right to counsel is contested terrain.7  
The right can be interpreted in a manner that enhances tenants’ 
organizing capacities, or it can be seen as a legitimization of housing 
policies that produce displacement. 
This Article examines the capacity of the right to counsel to 
effectively intervene in the affordable housing crisis through the lens 
of political economy and a critique of legal rights.  The theoretical 
thread that binds this Article together is based on the work of 
economic historian Karl Polanyi, which depicts an intrinsic tension 
between the market economy and society, with the dictates of the 
market cannibalizing societal institutions.8  In Polanyi’s formulation, 
the market economy’s tendency to commodify areas of life that are 
more properly social (land, labor, money) than economic leads to 
social disintegration and catastrophe.9  The application of the logic of 
the self-regulating market to matters of basic human sustenance 
results in the destruction of both society and the natural 
environment.10  Eventually — and inevitably — society fights back 
against this process of marketization, as countermovements of 
impacted people mobilize for social protection against austerity, 
 
effectively remove the economic incentive for landlords to displace tenants from 
rent-regulated housing. Despite major legislative efforts to create protections for 
renters in unregulated buildings, lawmakers did not approve the so-called “Good 
Cause” eviction bill. See Mark Weiner, NY Senate, Assembly Rent Reforms Leave 
Out ‘Good Cause’ Eviction Bill, SYRACUSE.COM (June 12, 2019), 
https://www.syracuse.com/politics/2019/06/ny-senate-assembly-rent-reforms-leave-
out-good-cause-eviction-bill.html [https://perma.cc/C66Z-4EJ5]. 
 5. Mayor de Blasio Signs Legislation to Provide Low-Income New Yorkers with 




 6. The de Blasio administration’s market-based housing policies are outlined in 
Section I.D. See infra Section I.D. 
 7. See John Whitlow, Beyond Access to Justice: Challenging the Neoliberal 
Roots of Hyper-Gentrification, L. & POL. ECON. BLOG (Apr. 9, 2018), 
https://lpeblog.org/2018/04/09/beyond-access-to-justice-challenging-the-neoliberal-
roots-of-hyper-gentrification/ [https://perma.cc/37K9-JFFY]. 
 8. See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 74 (2d ed., 2001). 
 9. GARETH DALE, KARL POLANYI: THE LIMITS OF THE MARKET 60 (2010). 
 10. Id. 
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unemployment, and displacement.11  These countermovements aim to 
subject the market economy to democratic and redistributivist 
interventions and can be strengthened by particular discourses of 
legal rights. 
In terms of the political-economic frame of this Article, New York 
City’s current housing crisis is viewed as connected to the city’s 
neoliberal reorganization in the wake of the fiscal crisis of the mid-
1970s.  The resolution of the fiscal crisis circumscribed the legislative 
authority of the municipal government and diminished the city’s 
famed social-democratic polity.12  It also inaugurated a public policy 
common sense that is premised on an entrepreneurial conception of 
state power that favors market-based solutions to social problems (for 
example, the affordable housing crisis)13 and that systematically 
converts social goods into private luxuries.14  In the decades following 
the city’s fiscal crisis, state-led initiatives and market forces have 
combined to render vast swaths of the city increasingly 
unaffordable.15 
The neoliberalization and subsequent gentrification of New York 
City have been legally constituted and have unfolded along vectors of 
race, class, and geography.  In the 1970s, the city lost home rule16 over 
many areas of residents’ everyday lives — including housing — 
 
 11. POLANYI, supra note 8, at 136–37. 
 12. See JOSHUA B. FREEMAN, WORKING-CLASS NEW YORK: LIFE AND LABOR 
SINCE WORLD WAR II 55–71 (2000). 
 13. The common sense of neoliberalism is, at its core, predicated on the belief 
that all of our social institutions function best when they work according to the 
principles of the market. This has meant the erosion of policies and practices based in 
the common good, and the emergence of a state apparatus, the main purpose of 
which is to facilitate capital accumulation rather than counter the deleterious effects 
of marketization. See LESTER K. SPENCE, KNOCKING THE HUSTLE: AGAINST THE 
NEOLIBERAL TURN IN BLACK POLITICS 9–10 (rev. ed. 2016). 
 14. This particular feature of neoliberalism — that is, the transformation of social 
goods to private luxuries — is eloquently taken up by E. Tammy Kim in an op-ed 
about the debate over student debt and free college. See E. Tammy Kim, Opinion, 
What Free College Really Means, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/30/opinion/warren-sanders-free-college.html 
[https://perma.cc/TT3J-RSF3]. 
 15. See SAMUEL STEIN, CAPITAL CITY: GENTRIFICATION AND THE REAL ESTATE 
STATE 47–48 (2019) [hereinafter STEIN, CAPITAL CITY]. 
 16. As part of the resolution of the fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s, much of New 
York City’s political sovereignty was ceded to the state via the creation of unelected 
emergency financial boards, which were responsible for reviewing the city’s 
operations and approving city contracts. See WILLIAM K. TABB, THE LONG DEFAULT: 
NEW YORK CITY AND THE URBAN FISCAL CRISIS 28 (1982). 
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thereby limiting municipal officials’ policymaking capacity.17  As part 
of the settlement of the fiscal crisis, both the city and state 
governments enacted harsh austerity measures that targeted working-
class, Black and Brown areas of the city, starving them of critical 
resources and effectively devalorizing them.18  In the decades 
following the loss of home rule, the state legislature hollowed out rent 
stabilization, and the municipal government — under successive 
mayoral administrations — has relied on a raft of market-based 
approaches to create affordable housing.19  These approaches, which 
include tax incentives and rezonings, have operated to marshal capital 
into many of the same areas devalorized during and after the fiscal 
crisis, placing upward pressure on land values and displacing longtime 
residents.20 
In recent years, the gentrification of urban space has been a core 
feature of New York City’s political-economic ecosystem, with real 
estate playing an increasingly prominent role as an engine of 
growth.21  The centrality of real estate has gone hand in hand with the 
intensifying commodification of housing, and is premised on the 
prioritization of housing’s economic value above its value as home.22  
While the market-based policy regime that has undergirded these 
processes has generated significant economic expansion, it has also 
dramatically reconfigured the city’s urban geography, resulting in 
increased inequality and social dislocation, and altering the race and 
class composition of entire neighborhoods.23 
 
 17. See KIM MOODY, FROM WELFARE STATE TO REAL ESTATE: REGIME CHANGE 
IN NEW YORK CITY, 1974 TO THE PRESENT 39 (2007). 
 18. See KIM PHILLIPS-FEIN, FEAR CITY: NEW YORK’S FISCAL CRISIS AND THE RISE 
OF AUSTERITY POLITICS 207–08 (2017). 
 19. See TOM ANGOTTI & SYLVIA MORSE, ZONED OUT: RACE, DISPLACEMENT, 
AND CITY PLANNING IN NEW YORK CITY 13 (2016). 
 20. See Samuel Stein, De Blasio’s Doomed Housing Plan, JACOBIN (Oct. 3, 2014), 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/10/de-blasios-doomed-housing-plan/ 
[https://perma.cc/9YSH-27MY]. 
 21. See STEIN, CAPITAL CITY, supra note 15, at 34. 
 22. DAVID MADDEN & PETER MARCUSE, IN DEFENSE OF HOUSING: THE POLITICS 
OF CRISIS 16–17 (2016). 
 23. NYU Furman Center’s State of New York City’s Housing and Neighborhoods 
found in 2015 that: 
Since the 1990s, the share of the population identifying as black or white has 
declined in the city as a whole, while the share identifying as Asian or 
Hispanic has increased. The share of the population that identified as black 
also declined in gentrifying neighborhoods between 1990 and 2010 (37.9% 
to 30.9%), but the share of population that identified as white increased 
(18.8% to 20.6%). The Asian and Hispanic shares also grew in gentrifying 
neighborhoods, but more slowly than they did in the city as a whole. 
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This Article examines the promises and limitations of the right to 
counsel against this political-economic backdrop, applying several 
critiques of the function of legal rights amid widening social 
inequalities.  It concludes that although legal rights within liberalism 
tend to leave intact — and may even reify — these inequalities, they 
can also, in certain cases, be deployed in a transformative manner.  
This occurs when legal rights are constructed to address concrete 
social harms; to call into question the material sources of those harms; 
and to help build new political formations capable of challenging the 
status quo.24  Polanyi’s theoretical framework offers a means by 
which to analyze the capacity of particular legal rights to contribute to 
social change, as the potency of legal rights can be evaluated 
according to the extent to which they support countermovements that 
challenge society’s governing values and institutions, forcing a 
recalibration of the relationship between the market economy and 
society. 
The right to counsel occupies a contested place in relation to this 
formulation of rights.  It can be viewed as a narrow, procedural right 
that helps individual tenants at risk of eviction.  More cynically, it can 
be seen as a legitimization of municipal development priorities that 
produce displacement.  But the right to counsel’s design facilitates a 
broader interpretation: its goal of producing positive substantive 
outcomes for tenants and its contention with private power gesture 
beyond individual Housing Court eviction proceedings, to the 
structural sources of the affordable housing crisis.  In this sense, the 
right to counsel forms a component part of a broader right to stay put 
for tenants, as well as a bulwark against the ongoing deconstruction of 
housing as a social good. 
In practice, tenants and their advocates have interpreted the right 
to counsel expansively, using it as a tool to support a vibrant, tenant-
led countermovement for housing justice across New York City.  This 
countermovement works against the grain of the legally-constituted 
 
MAXWELL AUSTENSEN ET AL., NYU FURMAN CTR., STATE OF NEW YORK CITY’S 
HOUSING AND NEIGHBORHOODS IN 2015 12 (2016), 
http://furmancenter.org/files/sotc/NYUFurmanCenter_SOCin2015_9JUNE2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HP6R-VWBG] (footnote omitted). 
 24. The verb “construct” is used intentionally here, as legal rights are made to be 
transformative when they are acted upon by people engaged in a process of collective 
mobilization for social change. This resonates with Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres’s 
depiction of social movements as “sources of law.” See Lani Guinier & Gerald 
Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Towards a Demosprudence of Law and Social 
Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2745 (2014). 
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commodification of housing that resulted from New York City’s 
neoliberal turn, and fights for the ability of poor, working-class, and 
marginalized people to remain and thrive in the places they call 
home, irrespective of market forces.  The right to counsel is a vital 
piece of this countermovement, which is deploying the right to build 
the organizing power of tenants and to fight for policy reforms that 
affirm housing’s value as home over its value as real estate. 
This Article examines the capacity of the right to counsel to 
support a tenant-based countermovement that targets the structural 
underpinnings of state-facilitated, market-based gentrification and 
displacement.  Part I of this Article sketches the context for the right 
to counsel, beginning with a description of the dynamics of Housing 
Court and moving on to a discussion of the structural bases of New 
York City’s escalating affordable housing crisis.  It applies Polanyi’s 
theoretical framework to New York City’s neoliberal turn in the 
1970s, and then looks at the gentrification of large sections of the city 
in the decades that followed.  Part II discusses the history and 
mechanics of the right to counsel and examines the extent to which 
the right to counsel can intervene in the housing crisis.  This 
discussion is grounded in an exploration of theories of legal rights and 
their capacity to contribute to transformative social change amid 
structural inequalities.  Part III returns to Polanyi’s theoretical 
framework, examining how the right to counsel supports an emergent 
countermovement for housing justice in the context of the city’s 
current housing crisis.  It discusses the manner in which this 
countermovement is interpreting and using the right to counsel in 
combination with organizing efforts for redistributive equality, 
democracy, and social justice in the housing sphere.  Part III 
concludes with a look at how the countermovement for housing 
justice envisions a city centered on housing as a social good rather 
than an agglomeration of real estate assets. 
I. CONTEXTUALIZING NEW YORK CITY’S AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
CRISIS 
“To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of 
human beings and their natural environment . . . would result in the 
demolition of society.”25 
 
 
 25. POLANYI, supra note 8, at 76. 
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The day before moving to New Mexico, in the summer of 2015, I 
took a long, meandering walk through Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn, 
the neighborhood where I held my first law job a decade earlier, 
representing low- and no-income tenants in eviction proceedings.26  I 
began the walk aimlessly, my mind wandering to travel and work 
plans and a future life in the Southwest, but I soon realized that I was 
being guided by an internal compass: The streets I was ambling down 
— Jefferson Avenue, Macon Street, Malcolm X Boulevard — were 
where many of my clients had lived, and I found myself stopping in 
front of buildings I recognized from years before.  As an attorney 
fresh out of law school, I had successfully represented a number of 
tenants here.  For the most part, my success had little to do with my 
expertise or knowledge, both of which were under-formed at the 
time.  In those years, I regularly felt as if I was acting at being an 
attorney, and that I was exceedingly fortunate to be doing anti-
eviction work in a jurisdiction with a relatively strong system of 
tenant protections.  Now, years later, I was slack-jawed at the extent 
to which the neighborhood had transformed, despite these 
protections.  Bedford-Stuyvesant — since the mid-twentieth century a 
predominantly African-American, working-class neighborhood, as 
well as a key site of Black politics and cultural production — had 
become visibly wealthier and whiter: luxury condo construction was 
commonplace, high-end restaurants and their clientele dotted the 
cityscape.  It is no exaggeration to say that the neighborhood felt 
overwhelmingly unfamiliar to me; it no doubt felt even more foreign 
to its longtime residents.27 
Walking around Bedford-Stuyvesant that day, I wondered what 
had happened to my former clients and their neighbors, most of 
whom had lived in rent-stabilized apartments in the neighborhood for 
many years.  And I wondered about the meaning of the work I had 
poured myself into a decade before: How should advocates make 
sense of winning individual victories for poor tenants when the 
ground beneath them was shifting, churned by forces largely hidden 
from view? 
 
 26. Each of this Article’s three Parts begins with a personal reflection from the 
author. These reflections are intended to accentuate themes from the Sections that 
follow them. 
 27. See generally NAIMA COSTER, HALSEY STREET (2017) (depicting, through a 
fictional account of the gentrification of Bedford-Stuyvesant, the sense of alienation 
and loss felt by longtime residents as a result of dramatic race and class changes in 
their neighborhood). 
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Part I lays out the political-economic context of New York City’s 
escalating affordable housing crisis, as well as the theoretical 
framework that supports this Article’s core arguments.  Section I.A 
describes the contours of the housing crisis and focuses on how the 
crisis manifests in Housing Court.  The latter is examined in terms of 
critical disparities along the lines of race, class, gender, and legal 
representation between landlord and tenant litigants.  Section I.B 
connects the housing crisis to the neoliberal reorganization of New 
York City’s political economy in the wake of the city’s fiscal crisis in 
the mid-1970s.  It grounds this process of neoliberalization in the 
theoretical intervention of economic historian Karl Polanyi, using the 
usurpation of municipal authority by the state legislature and the 
whittling down of the protections of rent stabilization as examples of 
Polanyi’s explication of the tension between the market economy and 
society.  Section I.C examines the impact of the settlement of the 
fiscal crisis on the spatial reconfiguration of the city, with a focus on 
how policies of targeted austerity set the stage for the city’s 
gentrification in recent decades.  Section I.D discusses how, since the 
fiscal crisis, mayoral administrations from both major political parties, 
operating within a constricted policy field, have opted 
overwhelmingly for market-based policies that have intensified 
housing’s commodification.  It details these market-based housing 
policies, connecting them to rising land values and displacement. 
A. The Housing Crisis and Housing Court 
New York City has had an affordable housing crisis for at least a 
century.28  In recent years, the crisis has intensified to the degree that 
commentators have characterized it as a humanitarian emergency.29  
The statistics paint a stark picture of New Yorkers’ housing troubles.  
In a period of stagnant wage growth,30 tenants, who comprise nearly 
70% of all city residents,31 have seen their rents increase 
 
 28. Kim Barker, Behind New York’s Housing Crisis: Weakened Laws and 
Fragmented Regulation, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/20/nyregion/affordable-housing-
nyc.html [https://perma.cc/8CJJ-3RD3]. See also supra note 2. 
 29. Michael Greenberg, Tenants Under Siege, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Aug. 17, 2017), 
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/08/17/tenants-under-siege-inside-new-york-
city-housing-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/ND56-C52W]. 
 30. See Patrick W. Watson, Real Wage Growth Is Actually Falling, FORBES (Sept. 
25, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/patrickwwatson/2018/09/25/real-wage-growth-
is-actually-falling/#1b627c117284 [https://perma.cc/XH2F-39P4]. 
 31. According to a recent analysis of census data, in 2016, 65% of New York 
residents were renters. Michael Kolomatsky, Which Cities Have More Renters?, 
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precipitously.  According to a recent study, a worker earning a 
minimum wage in 2019 would have to work 111 hours per week to 
afford a two-bedroom apartment in the city, leaving him or her with 
only 57 non-working hours per week.32  From 2010 to 2018, the rents 
for all apartments in New York City rose from an indexed $2093 to 
$2757, an increase of 31%.33  During the same period in Brooklyn, the 
site of the city’s steepest rent increases, indexed rents rose from $1839 
to $2545, an increase of 38%.34 
New York City residents’ housing struggles are further evidenced 
by the city’s swelling homeless shelters.  In 2016, more than 127,000 
people slept in shelters, and in 2015, although the city managed to 
move 38,000 people from shelters to permanent housing, the number 
of people who are homeless has increased.35  The city now has more 
 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/15/realestate/rent-
increases-2017.html [https://perma.cc/27GX-M2VH]. 
 32. See Out of Reach 2019: New York, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL. (Aug. 2, 
2019), https://nlihc.org/oor/new-york [https://perma.cc/M5JF-D352]. 
 33. See Emily McDonald, NYC Rents Are Rising This Fall, Defying the Typical 
Autumn Chill, STREETEASY: ONE BLOCK OVER (Nov. 15, 2018), 
https://streeteasy.com/blog/october-2018-market-reports/ [https://perma.cc/F2NV-
A85V]. The StreetEasy rent index tracks the change in asking rent for all apartments 
in New York City and controls for unit quality over time. 
The composition of the New York City sales or rental market may vary 
substantially month to month, with differing proportions of units of a given 
size, location, or bedroom count available at any specific time . . . [the rental 
index controls] for this variability by looking at the change in sale price or 
asking rent for each individual unit over time. Combining the change in 
prices of several units over time gives us a more complete picture of how 
prices for a given area or segment of the market change. 
Grant Long, Methodology: StreetEasy’s Price and Rent Indices, STREETEASY: ONE 
BLOCK OVER (July 27, 2017), https://streeteasy.com/blog/methodology-price-and-
rent-indices/ [https://perma.cc/3PJS-WWJK]. 
 34. See McDonald, supra note 33; American Community Survey (ACS), U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs 
[https://perma.cc/8T8R-GYLE] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019). See also Rental Burdens: 
Rethinking Affordability Measures, PD&R EDGE, 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/pdredge/pdr_edge_featd_article_092214.html 
[https://perma.cc/9YTK-ETG9] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019). A tenant is rent burdened 
when they spend over 30% of their household income on rent; severe rent burden is 
defined as over 50% of household income spent on rent. Id. With rising rents also 
comes displacement, but accurately measuring the number of people who have left a 
given place raises methodological challenges beyond the scope of this Article. In New 
York City, in particular, where residential turnover is high for many reasons, it is 
difficult to quantify the number of people who have left the city because they can no 
longer afford to live there. Rent as a proportion of household income, however, has 
been tracked by the Census Bureau for decades and provides a much more accurate 
measurement of the affordability crisis. See American Community Survey, supra note 
34. 
 35. Greenberg, supra note 29. 
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homeless people than at any time since the Great Depression.36  It is 
not an exaggeration to say that most New Yorkers live in precarious 
housing circumstances, struggling to make ends meet and to keep up 
with the rising cost of rent in a low-wage — and highly unequal — 
economy. 
The escalating affordable housing crisis is playing out in myriad 
ways across the city.  It takes the form of sharp rent increases (both 
lawful and unlawful), harassment by landlords, the withholding of 
necessary repairs, aggressive efforts to buy out low-income tenants, a 
steady stream of eviction proceedings, and overcrowded homeless 
shelters.37  This crisis cannot be boiled down to individual landlord-
tenant disputes, but such disputes can be viewed as ground battles 
that comprise a larger-scale war for New York City’s neighborhoods.  
New York City Housing Court, the venue that adjudicates these 
disputes, is the highest volume court in the country, hearing more 
cases annually than the combined civil dockets of all the federal 
district courts.38  Most of these cases are nonpayment proceedings, 
brought when tenants allegedly fall into rent arrears; a small fraction 
of all cases are holdover proceedings, which implicate a range of 
causes of action brought to evict on some basis other than 
nonpayment of rent.39 
The scales of justice have never been balanced in New York City 
Housing Court.  Even though the Court was initially conceived to 
address substandard housing conditions,40 very few cases are initiated 
by tenants who are seeking repairs in their apartments.  In four of the 
city’s five Housing Court branches,41 only one courtroom, presided 
over by a single judge, is devoted to adjudicating tenant-initiated 
 
 36. MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 22, at 1. 
 37. See Greenberg, supra note 29. 
 38. New York City Housing Court processes hundreds of proceedings each day. 
In the aggregate, it adjudicates more eviction cases annually than all the civil and 
criminal cases filed annually in all the federal district courts of the 50 states 
combined. See ANDREW SCHERER, RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT LAW IN NEW 
YORK (2017–2018 ed.), §§ 1:1–1:40. 
 39. See id. §§ 9:1–9:46. 
 40. The 1972 law that created Housing Court was explicitly intended to enforce 
landlord compliance with the Housing Maintenance Code as a means of serving the 
public interest. See Dennis E. Milton, The New York City Housing Part: New 
Remedy for an Old Dilemma, 3 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 267, 268 (1975). 
 41. New York City’s Housing Court system is organized geographically, with a 
Housing Part in each county or borough’s Civil Court. The Housing Court handles 
both residential and commercial landlord-tenant disputes, which are adjudicated by 
50 appointed judges. See New York City Housing Court, N.Y. UNIFIED CT. SYS., 
https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/housing [https://perma.cc/V5AE-LA2S]. 
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proceedings.  Meanwhile, the rest of the courtrooms, of which there 
are dozens, are devoted to handling all manner of landlord-initiated 
eviction proceedings.42  In most cases filed in Housing Court, tenants 
find themselves in a defensive posture, a misstep away from losing 
their homes.43 
Housing Court has also been unbalanced in terms of the relative 
attorney power brought to bear by landlords and tenants.  In an area 
of law that has been called an “impenetrable thicket” because of its 
opacity and complexity,44 90% of landlords have historically been 
represented by counsel, as compared to 5–10% of tenants.45  The 
imbalance in legal representation between landlords and tenants 
plays out in an overtly racist, classist, and sexist manner.  The vast 
majority of tenants in Housing Court are poor women of color, while 
the vast majority of landlords, landlord attorneys, and judges are 
upper-class White men.46  The power imbalances flowing from these 
disparities play a central role in the way the Court functions and is 
experienced by litigants and attorneys, making it feel more like a 
conveyor belt for predatory racial capitalism47 than a place where 
justice is meted out.48 
 
 42. See Civil Court–New York County–Term VIII–July 15, 2019 to August 11, 
2019, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., 
https://www.nycourts.gov/COURTS/nyc/SSI/term_sheets/nyterm.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2ZNH-GNZD]; Bronx Civil Court Term VIII July 15, 2019–August 
11, 2019, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., 
https://www.nycourts.gov/COURTS/nyc/SSI/term_sheets/bxterm.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WK7R-NLKX]; Civil Court–Kings County Term VIII–July 15, 
2019–August 11, 2019, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., 
https://www.nycourts.gov/COURTS/nyc/SSI/term_sheets/kingsterm.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P2PX-YL8F]; Civil Court of the City of New York–Queens County 
July 15, 2019 to August 11, 2019, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., 
https://www.nycourts.gov/COURTS/nyc/SSI/term_sheets/queensterm.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F2FH-MMSJ]. 
 43. In 2017, landlords filed approximately 230,000 residential eviction proceedings 
in Housing Court, including both nonpayment and holdover cases, resulting in 
approximately 21,000 evictions. N.Y.C. OFFICE OF CIVIL JUSTICE, 2017 ANNUAL 
REPORT AND STRATEGIC PLAN 18 (2017), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hra/downloads/pdf/services/civiljustice/OCJ_Annual_Re
port_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/29TJ-3CBX]. 
 44. 89 Christopher Inc. v. Joy, 318 N.E.2d 776, 780 (N.Y. 1974). 
 45. Harvey Gee, From Hallway Corridor to Homelessness: Tenants Lack Right to 
Counsel in New York Housing Court, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 87, 88 
(2010). 
 46. Kathryn Sabbeth, Housing Defense as the New Gideon, 41 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 55, 79 (2018). 
 47. According to historian Robin D.G. Kelley, the term “racial capitalism” was 
elaborated by Cedric Robinson to theorize the mutually-reinforcing, interconnected 
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A 2018 New York Times piece on housing court painted a bleak 
picture.49  According to the Times, Housing Court long ago became a 
tool for landlords to push out poor and working-class tenants and to 
wrest apartments out of rent regulation.50  According to the article, 
landlords — particularly those with expansive holdings — exploit a 
broken and overburdened system, inundating their tenants with court 
papers.51  They rely on an “eviction machine” in which landlord 
attorneys make money off of the volume of cases they handle each 
year and regularly manipulate gaps in enforcement to the detriment 
of tenants.52  In this portrayal, Housing Court appears as a space that 
has been weaponized by landlords intent on displacing their tenants, 
the vast majority of whom are left to navigate a complex legal process 
on their own.  It is the juridical expression of an affordable housing 
crisis that is spreading across New York City. 
 
historical relationship between racial differentiation and the capitalist mode of 
production. 
Capitalism was “racial” not because of some conspiracy to divide workers or 
justify slavery and dispossession, but because racialism had already 
permeated Western feudal society . . . . The tendency of European 
civilization through capitalism was thus not to homogenize but to 
differentiate — to exaggerate regional, subcultural, and dialectical 
differences into ‘racial’ ones. 
Robin D.G. Kelley, What Did Cedric Robinson Mean by Racial Capitalism, BOS. 
REV. (Jan. 12, 2017), bostonreview.net/race/robin-d-g-kelley-what-did-cedric-
robinson-mean-racial-capitalism [https://perma.cc/X4RD-HTDB]. 
 48. Anecdotally, when I started as a tenant attorney in Brooklyn Housing Court 
in 2004, one of the larger landlord law firms, Gutman, Mintz, Baker, and Sonnenfeldt 
(“Gutman Mintz”), was such a fixture in a particular room of the courthouse that 
court personnel, tenants, and tenant attorneys referred to the space as the “Gutman 
Mintz room.” When anyone needed to deal with one of the firm’s attorneys, they 
went — or were sent by a judge or court clerk — to the “Gutman Mintz room,” 
thereby giving the firm the not-so-subtle imprimatur of officialdom. Pro se tenants 
often assumed that the Gutman Mintz attorneys were affiliated with Housing Court 
because of their quasi-official courthouse location. For tenants and their advocates, 
the firm’s longtime occupation of courthouse space was a potent symbol of landlords’ 
relative power in the legal system, a reminder that housing court functioned 
overwhelmingly for the benefit of property owners. 
 49. See generally Kim Barker et al., The Eviction Machine Churning Through 
New York City, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/20/nyregion/nyc-affordable-
housing.html [https://perma.cc/D6QL-RZKP]. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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B. The Neoliberalization of New York City 
The current iteration of New York City’s housing crisis53 is an 
outgrowth of a sea change in governance that occurred in the 1970s, 
when a deep fiscal crisis ushered in a new policy and ideological 
paradigm.  The settlement of the fiscal crisis reorganized the city’s 
political economy along neoliberal lines, leaving critical economic 
sectors like real estate and finance in an enhanced position vis-à-vis 
the city’s multi-racial and multi-ethnic working class.  The shifting 
terrain of New York City’s political economy in the 1970s has deep 
resonances with the theoretical intervention of economic historian 
Karl Polanyi, which, as explored in this Section, depicts an intrinsic 
tension between the market economy and society, with the 
imperatives of the economic sphere coming to dominate social life. 
At the time of the fiscal crisis, planned suburbanization and 
deindustrialization had already depleted the municipal tax base,54 
calling into question the solvency of the institutions — public housing, 
rent regulation, public hospitals, public university system, municipal 
labor unions — that together formed what historian Joshua Freeman 
has called a social democratic polity.55  The economy of pre-crisis 
New York City could be viewed as a paradigmatic example of 
embedded liberalism,56 with unions and subaltern groups capable of 
making actionable demands for redistributive equality on the 
municipal government.57  After the crisis, this situation was altered 
considerably, as the municipality was granted a reprieve from 
bankruptcy in exchange for drastic cuts to the institutions and 
programs comprising the social democratic polity.58 
 
 53. MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 22, at 1. 
 54. See PHILLIPS-FEIN, supra note 18, at 21–22. 
 55. John Whitlow, Beyond Access to Justice: Challenging the Neoliberal Roots of 
Hyper-Gentrification, L. & POL. ECON. BLOG (Apr. 9, 2018) [hereinafter Whitlow, 
Access to Justice], https://lpeblog.org/2018/04/09/beyond-access-to-justice-
challenging-the-neoliberal-roots-of-hyper-gentrification/ [https://perma.cc/49JT-
PRGY]; see also JOSHUA FREEMAN, WORKING CLASS NEW YORK: LIFE AND LABOR 
SINCE WORLD WAR II 55–71 (2000) (describing how, in the years after World War II, 
the ramifications of labor politics in New York City increased access to jobs, housing, 
healthcare, education, and culture). 
 56. David Harvey describes embedded liberalism as the form of political-
economic organization, widely accepted in the decades following World War II, in 
which “the state [focuses] on full employment, economic growth, and the welfare of 
its citizens, and that state power should be freely deployed, alongside of or, if 
necessary, intervening in or even substituting for market processes to achieve these 
ends.” DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 10 (2007). 
 57. See MOODY, supra note 17, at 16–17. 
 58. Whitlow, Access to Justice, supra note 55. 
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The city’s move to austerity in the wake of the fiscal crisis was 
legally constituted and had a wide-ranging impact on the daily lives of 
New York City residents.  It was operationalized through the creation 
of state-run emergency control boards that evacuated political 
sovereignty from New York City to Albany.59  Through this process, 
New Yorkers were effectively disenfranchised, with local electoral 
participation turned into “an empty ritual.”60  Following the crisis 
settlement, many aspects of city residents’ lives that had previously 
been under the purview of elected city officials, from City College 
admissions to garbage collection and hospital expenditures, were 
determined by the unelected Emergency Financial Control Board 
(EFCB).61  The EFCB imposed harsh austerity measures, laying off 
15 of all city employees between January 1, 1975 and May 31, 1976.62  
Hospitals were closed, firehouse response times increased 
substantially, and conditions in jails and mental hospitals worsened.63  
A number of city neighborhoods, in particular those with sizable 
African-American and Latinx populations, were starved of municipal 
resources, their residents left to fend for themselves in an economy 
increasingly characterized by high unemployment and stagflation.64 
In the housing sphere, the city’s sovereignty had already been 
usurped by Albany at the time the fiscal crisis broke out.65  In 1971, 
the state legislature responded to the New York City Council’s 
expansion of tenant protections by passing the Urstadt Law, which 
removed the city’s home rule over its supply of rent-regulated 
housing.66  In the years following the Urstadt Law’s passage, rent 
stabilization, the city’s most prevalent form of affordable housing,67 
 
 59. See MOODY, supra note 17, at 38–39. 
 60. TABB, supra note 16, at 28. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 30. 
 63. See PHILLIPS-FEIN, supra note 18, at 207. 
 64. For a discussion of the economic crisis of the early 1970s, see HARVEY, supra 
note 56, 5–38. For a discussion of the ways in which working-class Black and Brown 
neighborhoods in New York City were starved of resources, see Deborah Wallace & 
Rodrick Wallace, Benign Neglect and Planned Shrinkage, VERSO (Mar. 25, 2017), 
https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/3145-benign-neglect-and-planned-shrinkage 
[https://perma.cc/H7ZJ-858D]. 
 65. See John Whitlow, Community Law Clinics in the Neoliberal City: Assessing 
CUNY’s Tenant Law and Organizing Project, 20 CUNY L. REV. 351, 366 (2017). 
 66. See Whitlow, Access to Justice, supra note 55; Joe Lamport, Repealing the 
Urstadt Law, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Jan. 25, 2005), 
https://www.gothamgazette.com/demographics/2727-repealing-the-urstadt-law 
[https://perma.cc/UL97-UAUQ]. 
 67. According to the Rent Guidelines Board, there were approximately 950,000 
rent-stabilized units in 2018. See N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., 2019 HOUSING 
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has been weakened by a raft of legislatively-created loopholes that 
allow landlords to remove regulated units from the system.68  For 
example, in 1997 the state legislature passed high-rent vacancy 
decontrol, which allowed rent-stabilized apartments to be removed 
from the regulatory system when they reach a specified rent level and 
are vacant.69  This provision effectively incentivized owners of rent-
stabilized buildings to increase rents to the threshold level and vacate 
their apartments in order to obtain higher, “market” rents.70 
In 2003, the Rent Stabilization Code was further altered to allow 
landlords to charge the legal, regulated rent, rather than the lower, 
preferential rent, upon renewal of a rent-stabilized lease.71  Prior to 
2003, preferential rents remained in place for the duration of a 
tenancy.72  In many instances, the leap from a preferential rent to the 
legally regulated rent can amount to hundreds of dollars, an 
untenable increase for many rent-stabilized tenants.73  These 
legislative loopholes have had a marked impact on the city’s supply of 
affordable housing.  From 1994 to 2017, approximately 290,958 units 
left the rent regulation system.74  This figure includes the loss of 
 
SUPPLY REP. (2019), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/rentguidelinesboard/pdf/hsr19.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2A8L-98AR]. 
 68. See OKSANA MIRONOVA, CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y N.Y., A GUIDE TO RENT 
REGULATION IN NEW YORK CITY: HOW IT WORKS, WHAT WENT WRONG, AND HOW 
TO FIX IT 8–10 (2019), https://smhttp-ssl-
58547.nexcesscdn.net/nycss/images/uploads/pubs/Rent_Reg_Explainer_V6.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QCA3-RZY2]. 
 69. It is worth noting that the City Council passed a version of high-rent vacancy 
decontrol in 1994 before the latter was codified by the State Legislature in 1997. See 
Steven Wishnia, If Your Rent Is Too Damn High, Blame Anthony Weiner, VILLAGE 
VOICE (May 2, 2018), https://www.villagevoice.com/2018/05/02/if-your-rent-is-too-
damn-high-blame-anthony-weiner/ [https://perma.cc/6CW6-SJMM]. 
 70. See Marcelo Rochabrun & Cezary Podkul, The Fateful Vote that Made New 
York City Rents So High, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 15, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-vote-that-made-new-york-city-rents-so-high 
[https://perma.cc/7X4X-LY82]. 
 71. See Amy Plitt, How New York’s Preferential Rent Loophole Is Unfairly Used 
Against Tenants, CURBED (Apr. 27, 2017, 5:32 PM), 
https://ny.curbed.com/2017/4/25/15425058/nyc-rent-stabilization-loophole-landlords 
[https://perma.cc/FEM7-CHQ3]. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See generally Cezary Podkul, New York Landlords Exploit Loophole to Hike 
Rents Despite Freeze, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 25, 2017, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/new-york-landlords-exploit-loophole-to-hike-
rents-despite-freeze [https://perma.cc/5G57-XCHU]. 
 74. See N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., CHANGES TO RENT STABILIZED HOUSING 
STOCK IN NEW YORK CITY IN 2017 9 (2018), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/rentguidelinesboard/pdf/changes18.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A2WD-MHQU]. It is worth noting that 143,446 rent-stabilized units 
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155,664 units via the high-rent vacancy deregulation mechanism 
alone.75  Notably, the renewal of the rent laws in June 2019 closed 
many of these loopholes, including high-rent vacancy decontrol and 
preferential rent rescission, marking the first time since the passage of 
the Urstadt Law that the tenant movement has made significant 
legislative gains at the state level. 
Post-Urstadt, New York City tenants and municipal legislators 
have been restricted from strengthening the city’s rent laws to 
preserve affordable housing.  They find themselves in the unenviable 
position of looking to Albany for relief or seeking small fixes to the 
city’s housing problems in areas where municipal sovereignty was 
retained.76  As with other areas of diminished municipal sovereignty, 
the Urstadt Law operated to wall off property — in this case, the 
city’s supply of rent-regulated apartments — from popular demands 
for redistributive equality.  The loss of sovereignty left municipal 
policymakers with a limited menu of options to address the city’s 
chronic shortage of affordable housing, a theme examined in Section 
I.D of this Article. 
Overall, the fiscal crisis allowed for a recalibration of the 
relationship between the city’s market economy and its social 
institutions, with the dictates of the former subordinating the 
commitments of the latter.  Through the settlement of the crisis, elite 
economic interests in key sectors consolidated their power, and 
municipal and state policies were reshaped to impose austerity on 
 
were added to the system during this time period. Id. at 9. Units being added to the 
system are usually due to the addition of 421-a units. Id. at 3. As noted later in this 
Article, however, units that are stabilized pursuant to a 421-a agreement generally 
only have stabilized status for the length of the tax abatement the owner is receiving 
and will become market-rate once the abatement expires. See infra Section I.D. 
 75. See id. at 6; MIRONOVA, supra note 68 (noting 1994 is used as the benchmark 
year because that was when high-rent vacancy decontrol became law in New York 
City). 
 76. For instance, the city retains control over the enforcement of the housing code 
and registration requirements for landlords. See, e.g., N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. 
& DEV., THE ABCS OF HOUSING: HOUSING RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR OWNERS 
AND TENANTS (2014), https://www1.nyc.gov/portal/apps/311_literatures/HPD/ABCs-
housing-singlepg.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KW65-FZHJ]. For example, in 2009, the New York City Council 
passed a law requiring corporate landlords organized as LLCs to register the names 
of their individual principals with the Department of Housing Preservation and 
Development. Aaron Short, New Effort in Williamsburg to ‘Unmask’ Landlords, 
BROOKLYN PAPER (Aug. 25, 2009), 
https://www.brooklynpaper.com/stories/32/35/williamsburg_courier_newsnhhyyth082
02009.html [https://perma.cc/7BE6-PTGB]. 
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workers and poor and marginalized people,77 who were left adrift in 
an economy characterized by joblessness and stagnant growth.78 
The entirety of this process calls to mind Polanyi’s analysis of the 
relation between the market economy and society.79  According to 
Polanyi, instead of the economy being embedded within, and 
subjected to, social relations — as was the case in pre-capitalist 
societies — in modern capitalism the economic sphere is 
disembedded from society, with societal institutions operating as a 
corollary to the market.80  The market economy establishes itself as 
hegemonic through the commodification of areas of social life (land, 
labor, money) that are more properly social than economic.81  This 
process is constituted substantially through the law, and it results in 
the separation of the economic and political spheres, with the former 
wielding disproportionate control over the latter.82 
When the economy is walled off from democratic intervention and 
veers too far in the direction of social disembededness — when 
society is substantially run according to the logic of the market — 
inequality, deprivation, and human suffering inevitably follow.83  
Ordinary people are forced to bear the costs of excessive 
marketization84 in the form of austerity, unemployment, and/or 
displacement.  According to Polanyi, the deleterious effects of the 
market’s subjugation of social life provoke countermovements that 
mobilize for social protection and the re-embedding of the market in 
society.85  The theme of countermovement, and its relation to 
discourses of legal rights, is explored in Section III.A. 
In In Defense of Housing, David Madden and Peter Marcuse apply 
Polanyi’s theoretical framework to New York City’s current 
 
 77. See JEREMIAH MOSS, VANISHING NEW YORK: HOW A GREAT CITY LOST ITS 
SOUL 108 (2017). 
 78. See David Harvey, The Enigma of Capital and the Crisis This Time, READING 
MARX’S CAPITAL WITH DAVID HARVEY (Aug. 30, 2010), 
http://davidharvey.org/2010/08/the-enigma-of-capital-and-the-crisis-this-time 
[https://perma.cc/QRH9-ST9K]. 
 79. “Market economy” instead refers to “an economic system controlled, 
regulated, and directed by market prices; order in the production and distribution of 
goods is entrusted to this self-regulating mechanism.” POLANYI, supra note 8, at 71. 
 80. FRED BLOCK, INTRODUCTION TO KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT 
TRANSFORMATION xxiv (2d ed., Beacon Press 2001) (1944). 
 81. See DALE, supra note 9, at 60. 
 82. See POLANYI, supra note 8, at 74. 
 83. See generally BLOCK, supra note 80. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See Dale, supra note 9, at 70. See infra Part III. 
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affordable housing crisis.86  Their focus is the commodification of 
housing, which has been facilitated by the settlement of the fiscal 
crisis and occurs when housing’s social uses are subordinated to its 
economic value.87  When this happens, housing becomes 
disembedded from traditional circuits of labor and social 
reproduction, and its role as an investment overtakes all other claims 
upon it.88  The divergence between the use value of a dwelling as 
home versus its exchange value as a vehicle for capital accumulation 
is the central dilemma of property in a market economy.  This has 
long animated political struggles over urban space.89 
According to Madden and Marcuse, in recent years New York City 
has reached the point of hyper-commodification, meaning that 
virtually all of housing’s material and legal structures — “buildings, 
land, labor, property rights” — have been turned into commodities.90  
Housing’s hyper-commodification is interlinked with rising inequality 
and has been driven by processes of deregulation, financialization, 
and globalization.91  As the state has cut regulations that protect 
tenants (for example, the aforementioned whittling down of the 
protections of rent stabilization following the passage of the Urstadt 
Law), large-scale corporate financial interests have increased their 
investments in urban real estate markets.  These interests are 
increasingly transnational, as reflected in the proliferation of private 
equity real estate investment.92  They connect cities’ local housing 
stocks to global investment circuits.93  Tenants in global cities 
characterized by overheated real estate markets feel the brunt of 
housing’s hyper-commodification, as their continued residence in 
their homes comes to be seen as a drag on property owners’ right to 
maximize potentially high returns on their assets.94 
 
 86. See MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 22, at 50. 
 87. See id. at 17. Madden and Marcuse define “commodification” as “the general 
process by which the economic value of a thing comes to dominate its other uses.” Id. 
 88. See id. These claims may be “based upon right, need, tradition, legal 
precedent, cultural habit, or the ethical and affective significance of the home.” Id. 
 89. See generally Kathe Newman & Elvin K. Wyly, The Right to Stay Put, 
Revisited: Gentrification and Resistance to Displacement in New York City, 43 URB. 
STUD. 23 (2006). 
 90. MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 22, at 26. 
 91. See id. at 28–34. 
 92. See id. at 33. 
 93. See RAQUEL ROLNIK, URBAN WARFARE: HOUSING UNDER THE EMPIRE OF 
FINANCE 16–17 (2019). 
 94. See MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 22, at 42–43. 
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Following the theoretical path blazed by Polanyi, New York City’s 
affordable housing crisis comes into focus when viewed through the 
lens of housing’s intensifying commodification, which, as discussed, is 
part and parcel of capitalism’s tendency towards marketization.  The 
reorganization of New York City’s political economy along neoliberal 
lines in the 1970s enabled the deconstruction of housing as a social 
good in the ensuing decades.  This process has been carried out 
through laws and policies that have reduced protections for tenants 
while at the same time prioritizing real estate as the predominant 
motor of urban capital accumulation.95 
C. From Neoliberalization to Gentrification 
Gentrification is a contested term that evokes strong reactions 
from across the political spectrum.96  Originally coined by the British 
sociologist Ruth Glass to refer to the invasion of Central London by 
the middle class in the 1960s,97 gentrification has morphed 
substantially from its somewhat quaint origins.  Echoing Madden and 
Marcuse’s Polanyian framing of housing’s hyper-commodification, 
Jeremiah Moss argues that in recent years, New York City has 
reached a phase of hyper-gentrification in which virtually the entire 
city has been taken over by capital.98  If early periods of gentrification 
can be thought of in terms of relatively well-off individuals moving 
into urban areas in search of affordability and diversity, the current 
iteration is driven by the union of market-based public policy with 
 
 95. See STEIN, CAPITAL CITY, supra note 15, at 45. 
 96. For an overview of divergent frameworks for understanding gentrification, see 
Newman & Wyly, supra note 89. For Newman and Wyly, “[g]entrification is directly 
related to how cities experience economic transformation and policy interventions. 
The urban disinvestment produced by economic change and federal urban policy 
along with the individual desire for the suburban dream laid the groundwork for 
gentrification’s appearance.” Id. at 26. 
 97. Glass’s fuller depiction of gentrification is as follows: 
One by one, many of the working-class quarters of London have been 
invaded by the middle classes — upper and lower. Shabby, modest mews 
and cottages — two rooms up and two down — have been taken over, when 
their leases have expired, and have become elegant, expensive residences. 
Larger Victorian houses, downgraded in an earlier or recent period — 
which were used as lodging houses or were otherwise in multiple occupation 
— have been upgraded once again . . . once this process of ‘gentrification’ 
starts in a district it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original working-
class occupiers are displaced and the whole social character of the district is 
changed. 
RUTH GLASS ET AL., LONDON: ASPECTS OF CHANGE xviii–xix (1964). 
 98. See MOSS, supra note 77, at 39–40. 
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private real estate and finance capital.99  In the words of Neil Smith, 
gentrification is best viewed as “a back-to-the-city movement by 
capital rather than people.”100 
Gentrification is bound up with how cities were caught up in and 
adapted to the global economic slowdown of the early 1970s.  During 
this period, many urban economies in the advanced capitalist world 
experienced a dramatic loss of manufacturing jobs.101  Concomitantly, 
they found themselves deprived of much of the traditional protection 
of national state institutions, as deregulation, privatization, and the 
dismantling of the welfare state became the coin of the policy 
realm.102  In this context, real estate moved to the fore as an 
increasingly vital engine of economic growth.103  State-facilitated, 
market-driven gentrification became a hallmark of the economic 
development strategies of emerging global cities, including New 
York.104 
The interconnected concepts of the rent gap and the revanchist 
city105 are highly useful in understanding how the gentrification of 
New York City has been powered in the decades following the fiscal 
crisis.  The rent gap represents the difference between the potential 
ground rent level and the actual ground rent capitalized under the 
present land use.106  Real estate speculators invest in a particular area 
because they determine that there is “a gap between the rents that 
land currently offers and the potential future rents it might [offer] if 
some action were taken, such as evicting long-term tenants . . . or 
demolishing and reconstructing buildings.”107  For purposes of this 
Article, rent gaps are generated by the capital devalorization of 
particular areas of the city, followed by urban development and 
expansion that leads to increased potential rent levels in the future.108  
The rent gap theory posits that a particular zone of the city can 
become profitable precisely because it has been under-resourced and 
devalorized in a given historical moment, provided there is a 
compelling indication of future profitability in a subsequent 
 
 99. See id. at 37. 
 100. NEIL SMITH, THE NEW URBAN FRONTIER: GENTRIFICATION AND THE 
REVANCHIST CITY 70 (1996). 
 101. See STEIN, CAPITAL CITY, supra note 15, at 53. 
 102. See SMITH, supra note 100, at 36–39. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See id. 
 105. See id. at 49–71, 206–27. 
 106. See id. at 65. 
 107. STEIN, CAPITAL CITY, supra note 15, at 49. 
 108. See SMITH, supra note 100, at 67–68. 
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moment.109  State action is operative at both ends of the rent gap 
cycle because public policy can devalorize urban space and later 
revalorize it. 
Rent gaps operate at varying scales — within a city, neighborhood, 
block, and even a single building — and have been directly impacted 
by the laws and policies that have constituted housing’s increasing 
commodification.  For example, the rent regulations that cover nearly 
half the private rental units in New York have kept hundreds of 
thousands of apartments at below-market rents for decades.110  This 
phenomenon creates a rent gap that landlords are actively seeking to 
close through a range of tactics, including evictions, buyouts, and 
harassment of working-class tenants.111  As rent regulations have 
been whittled down in recent decades,112 these rent gaps can more 
readily be closed by landlords and speculators, who can increase 
rents, displace tenants, and deregulate rent-stabilized units through 
lawful means.113 
Just as the rent gap is indispensable in understanding how state and 
private forces have contributed to the gentrification of New York 
City, the concept of the revanchist city114 is useful in exploring 
gentrification’s interlocking race and class dimensions.  For Smith, 
revanchism — the French word for revenge — refers to the all-out 
attack, in the post-crisis period, on the social policy structures of the 
New Deal.115  In New York City during and after the fiscal crisis, 
revanchism played out through the construction of blame for the 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. See STEIN, CAPITAL CITY, supra note 15, at 50. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See generally Craig Gurian, Let Them Rent Cake: George Pataki, Market 
Ideology, and the Attempt to Dismantle Rent Regulation in New York, 31 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 339 (2004) (discussing the process through which the protections of rent 
stabilization have been scaled back). 
 113. This Article highlights the lawful means used by owners of rent-stabilized 
properties. It should also be noted that unlawful tactics are common and are given 
unofficial sanction by the lack of regulatory oversight in this area. Anecdotally, when 
I was representing tenants in the gentrifying neighborhood of Bushwick, Brooklyn in 
the 2000s, it was common to see landlords aggressively raising rents to the high-rent 
vacancy decontrol threshold — then $2000 a month — through lawful and unlawful 
mechanisms so as to deregulate rent-stabilized units. 
 114. See SMITH, supra note 100, at 45. 
 115. See id. at 42–44; see also JORDAN CAMP, INCARCERATING THE CRISIS 9 (2016) 
(writing about the emergence of the carceral-security state as a response to the gains 
of the Black freedom movement, and arguing that “[r]evanchism is reproduced 
through the common-sense notions of race, class, gender, and sexuality underpinning 
neoliberalization, and through the depiction of labor, civil rights, feminist, and 
socialist movements as the enemies of the nation”). 
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city’s dire economic predicament.116  The causes of this economic 
predicament were distorted and racialized by politicians and media 
outlets,117 which cast Black and Brown residents and a largely 
minority municipal workforce as undeserving beneficiaries of 
profligate social spending.118  In this way, “[t]he cultural ideologies of 
the crisis . . . inculpated a supposedly unruly populace that wasted 
municipal resources and brought disrepute to the formerly glittering 
metropolis.”119  The post-crisis racialized blame game served as the 
ideological basis for the targeted cuts to the city’s social democratic 
polity that this Article described in the previous Section. 
In the wake of the fiscal crisis, revanchist policies operated along 
vectors of race, class, and geography, leading to the near ruination of 
predominantly Black and Latinx working-class sections of the city.120  
In a 1976 New York Times op-ed, Housing and Development 
Administrator Roger Starr advocated for a policy of “planned 
shrinkage,” which refers to the removal of social services from the 
city’s most impoverished neighborhoods.121  Even though it was not 
official city policy, shrinkage offered a rationale for making cuts, a 
way to see them as part of a plan that dovetailed with a pared-down, 
 
 116. SMITH, supra note 100, at 207. According to Smith: 
Revanchist antiurbanism represents a reaction against the supposed “theft” 
of the city, a desperate defense of a challenged phalanx of privileges, 
cloaked in the populist language of civic morality, family values, and 
neighborhood security. More than anything the revanchist city expresses a 
race/class/gender terror felt by middle- and ruling-class whites who are 
suddenly stuck in place by a ravaged property market, the threat and reality 
of unemployment, the decimation of social services, and the emergence of 
minority and immigrant groups, as well as women, as powerful urban actors. 
It portends a vicious reaction against minorities, the working class, homeless 
people, the unemployed, women, gays and lesbians, immigrants. 
Id. 
 117. See generally MOODY, supra note 17, at 49. 
 118. See id. 
 119. HILLARY MILLER, DROP DEAD: PERFORMANCE IN CRISIS, 1970S NEW YORK 2 
(2016). 
 120. See TABB, supra note 16, at 38–39. 
 121. See generally Roger Starr, Opinion, Making New York Smaller, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 14, 1976), https://www.nytimes.com/1976/11/14/archives/making-new-york-
smaller-the-citys-economic-outlook-remains-grim.html [https://perma.cc/VLA7-
LED3]. Starr also said: 
Stop the Puerto Ricans and the rural blacks from living in the 
city . . . reverse the role of the city . . . it can no longer be the place of 
opportunity . . . our urban system is based on the theory of taking the 
peasant and turning him into an industrial worker. Now there are no 
industrial jobs. Why not keep him a peasant. 
MOSS, supra note 77, at 76–77. 
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austere vision of urban life.122  During and after the crisis, in a state-
led move that has been characterized as “organized abandonment,”123 
many city neighborhoods were starved of essential public services, 
like firehouses and health clinics, and their residents’ public benefits 
were slashed.124  Land values in these neighborhoods declined to such 
an extent that it was sometimes considered more profitable for 
landlords to abandon their buildings rather than continue to rent 
them.125 
Read together, the concept of revanchism and the rent gap theory 
are key to understanding how the neoliberal political-economic 
reorganization of New York City in the 1970s paved the way for the 
city’s subsequent gentrification.  The post-crisis turn to a politics of 
targeted austerity, implemented in a climate of racialized blame for 
the economic downturn, fed into substantial public and private 
disinvestment from vast swaths of the city.126  In the 1970s and 1980s, 
neighborhoods like the South Bronx, Bushwick, and Bedford-
Stuyvesant were starved of resources and effectively devalorized by 
revanchist state practices.  This process of devalorization contributed 
to the emergence, in the ensuing decades, of rent gaps in many of 
these same areas, which would become magnets for capital 
investment when the economy rebounded.  The diminished, austere 
New York City of the crisis and post-crisis years is inextricably linked 
to the waves of state-facilitated, market-driven gentrification and 
displacement that have operated to reorganize urban space in recent 
decades. 
D. Market-Based Approaches to Affordable Housing 
Successive mayoral administrations, operating within a 
policymaking field constricted by the terms of the crisis settlement, 
have relied overwhelmingly on market-based strategies to preserve 
and create affordable housing.127  Due to their limited ability to 
 
 122. See PHILLIPS-FEIN, supra note 18, at 208. 
 123. Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Forgotten Places and the Seeds of Grassroots Planning, 
in ENGAGING CONTRADICTIONS: THEORY, POLITICS, AND METHODS OF ACTIVIST 
SCHOLARSHIP 32 (Charles R. Hale ed., 2008). 
 124. See PHILLIPS-FEIN, supra note 18, at 208. 
 125. See MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 22, at 174. 
 126. See PHILLIPS-FEIN, supra note 18, at 207. 
 127. See Jason Hackworth & Neil Smith, The Changing State of Gentrification, 92 
TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR ECONOMISCHE EN SOCIALE GEOGRAFIE 464, 464–65, 469, 471–72 
(2000). Although a reliance on market-based policies has been a through-line of New 
York City’s municipal governance since the crisis settlement, the gentrification of 
urban space has taken different forms. See generally id. Neil Smith and Jason 
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strengthen rent protections and create public housing, municipal 
officials have focused on incentivizing capital investment in many of 
the same neighborhoods devalorized during and immediately after 
the fiscal crisis.128  This approach has had the dual effect of elevating 
land values and increasing displacement.129  This Section describes 
several key state-sponsored, market-based programs that are 
representative of this dynamic: the J-51 tax abatement, the 421-a tax 
abatement, and rezoning.  It will then connect these programs to the 
current affordable housing crisis. 
The J-51 tax abatement program was designed to incentivize the 
rehabilitation of older buildings by tying a tax exemption and 
abatement to the cost of the rehabilitation.130  This program has 
helped to revitalize the city’s aging housing stock and has also 
contributed to displacement.131  New York City enacted the J-51 
program in 1955, but it came into widespread use decades later, as 
 
Hackworth have developed a comprehensive theory of gentrification’s stages, in 
which cycles of investment and disinvestment continually reconfigure urban space. 
See generally id. In Hackworth and Smith’s formulation, the first wave of 
gentrification, which occurred in the 1970s, is sporadic and mainly state-led. Id. at 
466. In its second wave, which occurred in the 1980s, gentrification was integrated 
into a wider range of economic and cultural processes at the global and national 
scales. Id. at 468. The third wave of gentrification, which began in the 1990s, has been 
characterized by an intensification of the scale of investment and the level of 
corporate, as opposed to smaller-scale capital. Id. 
 128. See Adele Oltman, Zoning for the 1, DISSENT MAG. (Nov. 3, 2018), 
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/inwood-rezoning-bill-de-blasio-mih 
[https://perma.cc/749N-DHVS]. 
 129. See Samuel Stein, Gentrification Is a Feature, Not a Bug, of Capitalist Urban 
Planning, JACOBIN (Mar. 12, 2019), 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/03/gentrification-is-a-feature-not-a-bug-of-
capitalist-urban-planning [https://perma.cc/Q9SV-BRU3]. 
 130. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 11-243 (2006); Directory of NYC Housing 
Programs, NYU FURMAN CTR., https://furmancenter.org/coredata/directory/entry/j-
51-tax-incentive [https://perma.cc/4RKB-YT64] (last visited Aug. 30, 2019). The 
program offers a 14-year exemption and 4-year phase-out of the benefit for “gut” 
building rehabilitation (a more comprehensive form of rehabilitating a building) and 
a 32-year exemption and 4-year phase-out for “moderate” rehabilitation of an 
occupied residential multiple dwelling by awarding the owner a 32-year exemption in 
tax increases. See Debra S. Vorsanger, New York City’s J-51 Program: Controversy 
and Revision, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 103, 112, 113–14, 117 (1984). The “moderate” 
rehabs grew to encompass most rehabs that owners would do, and includes many of 
the same rehabilitations an owner would perform as a Major Capital Improvement 
including a new boiler, new elevator (or substantial rehab of the elevator), new 
piping for gas or water, and a new water storage tank. See id. at 113. 
 131. See J-51 Tax Break Adds Up to Millions in Lost Revenue to Upgrade Fewer 
Apartments, COMTY. SERV. SOC’Y (Jun. 7, 2012), 
https://www.cssny.org/news/entry/css-report-reveals-j-51-tax-breaks-add-up-to-
millions-in-lost-revenue-to-up [https://perma.cc/6RGK-KK4X]. 
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part of Mayor Ed Koch’s “In-Rem Foreclosure” program.132  Koch’s 
1986 Ten-Year Plan invested city resources in the rehabilitation of 
housing, and the J-51 tax abatement became the main tool through 
which the city incentivized landlords to repair dilapidated 
buildings.133  The J-51 program contains an affordability component 
— units in participating buildings must remain rent-stabilized for the 
duration of the program’s benefits.134  The rehabilitation component 
of the program has led to increased land values, but the program’s 
temporary nature has meant that rent-stabilized tenants often become 
vulnerable when the tax abatement runs its course.135  This 
confluence of forces has resulted in a tendency toward displacement 
in former J-51 buildings,136 a tendency that is particularly pronounced 
in a perpetually overheated real estate market. 
While the J-51 program promotes the rehabilitation of already-
existing buildings, the 421-a tax abatement program is meant to 
encourage new residential development.137  Under 421-a, property 
owners are taxed on the initial value of land for a discrete time, rather 
than the subsequent increased value after the land is developed.138  In 
general, tenants residing in a building that is receiving 421-a tax 
benefits should have a rent-stabilized lease.139  An amendment to the 
law in 2006 requires all affordable units in a 421-a building to be rent-
stabilized for 35 years, regardless of whether a tenant has vacated the 
 
 132. Dennis Hevesi, Transforming City’s Housing: Act 2, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 
2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/02/realestate/transforming-city-s-housing-
act-2.html [https://perma.cc/U77P-JZB8]. 
 133. See Alex Schwartz, New York City and Subsidized Housing: Impacts and 
Lessons of the City’s $6 Billion Capital Budget Housing Plan, 10 HOUSING POL’Y 
DEBATE 839, 840, 843 (1999). 
 134. See N.Y. STATE HOMES & COMTY. RENEWAL, DHCR J-51 REGISTRATION 
AND RENT-REVISION INITIATIVE: LIST OF BUILDINGS THAT MAY HAVE BEEN OUT OF 
COMPLIANCE AT SOME POINT(S) FROM 2012 TO 2017 DUE TO LISTING MULTIPLE 
APARTMENTS AS PERMANENTLY EXEMPT FROM STABILIZATION, 
https://hcr.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/03/j-51list3explanation.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L4RV-FASV]. 
 135. See Cezary Podkul, New York Isn’t Telling Tenants They May Be Protected 
from Big Rent Hikes, PROPUBLICA (July 6, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/new-york-isnt-telling-tenants-they-may-be-
protected-from-big-rent-hikes [https://perma.cc/SY2H-ZPTW]. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See Seth B. Cohen, Teaching an Old Policy New Tricks: The 421-A Tax 
Program and the Flaws of Trickle-Down Housing, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 757, 764–66 
(2009). 
 138. See id. at 765. 
 139. See id. 
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unit.140  Market rate units are only covered under rent stabilization 
for the duration of the tax abatement.141  Regardless of when the tax 
benefits expire or whether a unit is market rate or affordable, an 
owner may only remove a unit from rent stabilization when the tenant 
vacates the apartment.142 
The 421-a program was enacted in 1971 by the state legislature in 
response to high levels of vacancies and the loss of tax revenue 
stemming from White, middle-class flight to the suburbs,143 but now 
operates in a vastly different context.  The city is in the midst of a 
long real estate boom, and 421-a continues to provide developers of 
luxury real estate enormous tax exemptions, including in 
neighborhoods that have thoroughly gentrified and no longer require 
tax incentivizes to foster development.144 
The amount of affordable housing produced by 421-a has been 
minimal, since rental amounts are primarily pegged to Area Mean 
Income (AMI)145 and, for most of the program’s existence, the only 
requirements for affordable development have fallen within specified 
exclusion zones.146  But the impact of both the 421-a and J-51 
programs on New York City’s tax revenue has been substantial.  In 
the most recent fiscal year, the city has foregone tax revenue for 
72,390 projects under 421-a, with a total assessed value of $11.2 
billion, and an actual loss of tax revenue of $1.4 billion.147  During this 
same period, the J-51 program has resulted in $215 million in lost tax 
revenue.148 
 
 140. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX § 421-a(7)(e) (2017). 
 141. See Cohen, supra note 137, at 776. 
 142. N.Y. STATE DIV. OF HOUS. & CMTY. RENEWAL, FACT SHEET #41 TAX 
ABATEMENTS (2010), http://www.nyshcr.org/Rent/FactSheets/orafac41.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GM5C-4BU5]. 
 143. See Cohen, supra note 137, at 764. 
 144. See generally PRATT CTR. FOR CMTY. DEV., STILL SUBSIDIZING LUXURY 
DEVELOPMENT: 50 HIGH-END CONDO DEVELOPMENTS THAT WOULD STILL BE 
ELIGIBLE FOR 421-A TAX BREAKS EVEN AFTER PROPOSED EXCLUSION ZONE 
EXPANSION AND REFORM (2006), http://prattcenter.net/sites/default/files/rpt_-_421a-
still_subsidizing_luxury_development.pdf [https://perma.cc/YGY3-VST7]. 
 145. See HOUS. N.Y., MANDATORY INCLUSIONARY HOUSING (MIH), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/plans-studies/mih/mih-
summanry-adopted.pdf [https://perma.cc/SE69-S7B7] (last visited Aug. 29, 2019). 
 146. See N.Y.C. LOCAL LAW 58 (2006). 
 147. CITY OF N.Y. DEP’T OF FIN., ANNUAL REPORT ON TAX EXPENDITURES 17–18 
(2018), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/finance/downloads/pdf/reports/reports-tax-
expenditure/ter_2018_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/LB2P-8DQX]. 
 148. Id. at 15. 
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Another key tool that New York City has used to attempt to 
stimulate the construction of affordable housing is inclusionary 
zoning.  Inclusionary zoning policies incentivize private developers to 
incorporate a percentage of below-market-rate units in new 
developments by altering zoning laws to allow for taller structures.149  
Beginning with the Bloomberg administration, the city has used its 
considerable authority over the zoning process to dictate what kinds 
of new developments are permitted in specific areas of the city.150  
During the Bloomberg years, development was focused in and around 
Manhattan, with few affordability requirements.151  Under 
Bloomberg, 37% of land in the city was rezoned in almost 140 
separate zoning actions.152  Bloomberg’s approach allowed for a 
voluntary “inclusionary zoning” approach, which granted developers 
an extra 20% floor area in exchange for 20% “affordable” units (based 
on NYC AMI).153  Some developments elected for this approach, but 
it produced few affordable units.154 
Although the de Blasio administration expressed a commitment to 
addressing issues of inequality and affordable housing,155 it continues 
to operate squarely within Bloomberg’s market-based policy 
framework.156  It has also expanded neighborhood-wide rezoning to 
the outer boroughs and attached affordability requirements.157  As 
 
 149. See THOMAS ANGOTTI, NEW YORK FOR SALE: COMMUNITY PLANNING 
CONFRONTS GLOBAL REAL ESTATE 54 (2008). 
 150. See MOODY, supra note 17, at 215. 
 151. See id. 
 152. ANGOTTI & MORSE, supra note 19, at 32. 
 153. See id. at 69. 
 154. Id. Voluntary inclusionary zoning, which had existed since 1987 in some form, 
only produced approximately 7000 units prior to the de Blasio administration. See 
Creating Affordable Housing Out of Thing Air: The Economics of Mandatory 
Inclusionary Zoning in New York City, NYU FURMAN CTR. (Mar. 2015), 
https://furmancenter.org/files/NYUFurmanCenter_CreatingAffHousing_March2015.
pdf [https://perma.cc/D8KV-GBXH]. 
 155. See Text of Bill de Blasio’s First State of the City Address, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
10, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/11/nyregion/text-of-bill-de-blasios-first-
state-of-the-city-address.html [https://perma.cc/2MCY-V4UZ] (“Because the truth is, 
the state of our city, as we find it today, is a Tale of Two Cities — with an inequality 
gap that fundamentally threatens our future.”). 
 156. See generally Vincent Michael, New York Is Still a Tale of Two Cities, 
SOCIALIST WORKER (Mar. 14, 2017), https://socialistworker.org/2017/03/14/new-york-
is-still-a-tale-of-two-cities [https://perma.cc/TNA8-LYZG]. 
 157. See generally Mayor de Blasio Unveils ‘Housing New York’: A Five-Borough, 
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every mayor since Koch has done, de Blasio crafted a housing plan 
soon after entering office.158  Released in May 2014, the plan aims to 
build or preserve 200,000 units of affordable housing by 2024 — the 
most ambitious plan by a New York City mayor yet.159  The plan 
specifically calls for preserving 120,000 stabilized units — mainly 
through right to counsel funding — and constructing 80,000 new units 
by up-zoning outer borough neighborhoods and creating Mandatory 
Inclusionary Housing (MIH) provisions for new construction in 
rezoned areas.160  This approach has focused on under-developed 
neighborhoods in the city like East New York in Brooklyn, East 
Harlem in Manhattan, and Far Rockaway in Queens.161 
The case of East New York is illustrative of how de Blasio’s 
economic development plan impacts the city’s affordable housing 
crisis.  East New York was a telling choice for the first neighborhood 
to be upzoned under the de Blasio plan, as it is an example of a 
redlined, disinvested, and “blockbusted” neighborhood that remained 
Black and working-class as much of the rest of the borough became 
whiter and wealthier.162  Immediately after the 2014 announcement of 
the neighborhood’s rezoning, real estate speculation in the 
neighborhood spiked, driving up land values, which in turn drove up 
rents.163  In the two years after the rezoning plan was announced, 
 
 158. See STEIN, CAPITAL CITY, supra note 15, at 100. 
 159. See Mayor de Blasio Unveils ‘Housing New York’, supra note 157. 
 160. See CITY OF N.Y., HOUSING NEW YORK: A FIVE-BOROUGH, TEN-YEAR PLAN 
29 (2014), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdf/housing_plan.pdf 
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of three), or 30% of affordable at roughly 80% AMI ($62,200 for a family of three). 
See id. at 19. For reference, the median household income in East Harlem in 2017 
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Neighborhood Data Profiles, MN11: East Harlem, NYU FURMAN CTR., 
https://furmancenter.org/neighborhoods/view/east-harlem [https://perma.cc/N3K7-
AT3E] (last visited Aug. 30, 2019). 
 161. See generally Abigail Savitch-Lew, A New Year’s Update on the de Blasio 
Rezonings, CITYLIMITS (Dec. 28, 2017), https://citylimits.org/2017/12/28/a-new-years-
update-on-the-de-blasio-rezonings/ [https://perma.cc/BT4T-ULNQ]. 
 162. See STEIN, CAPITAL CITY, supra note 15, at 101. 
 163. See generally Samar Khurshid, The East New York Rezoning, One Year 
Later, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Mar. 23, 2017), http://www.gothamgazette.com/city/6825-
the-east-new-york-rezoning-one-year-later [https://perma.cc/E5Q8-YXBV]; see also 
SCOTT M. STRINGER, CITY OF N.Y. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, MANDATORY 
INCLUSIONARY HOUSING AND THE EAST NEW YORK REZONING: AN ANALYSIS (Dec. 
2, 2015), https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-
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prices for lots with small buildings (six units or fewer) jumped 63%.164  
And home prices increased by 13.7% in 2015 after increasing a total of 
15.5% from 2011 to 2015.165  East New York has also become one of 
the primary neighborhoods in the city for “flipping” homes by 
investors — in 2015, the area led the city with 94 homes flipped.166  
The increase in land values produced by the rezoning continues to 
incentivize the harassment and eviction of longtime tenants in the 
neighborhood.167  East New York was one of the first zip codes in the 
city to receive guaranteed tenant representation under the Right to 
Counsel, but there were 1671 evictions from 2017 to 2018 in zip codes 
11207 and 11208.168 
Mainstream critiques of market-based approaches to affordable 
housing tend to focus on the relatively small quantity of affordable 
units produced.169  While these critiques are useful, they miss the 
deeper, more structural flaw: market-based housing policies marshal 
significant capital into places that are already experiencing 
gentrification and, as a result, place upward pressure on an area’s land 
values, ultimately incentivizing speculation and contributing to  
gentrification.170  In other words, market-based approaches to 
affordable housing tend to exacerbate the problem they target by 
making housing more expensive and rendering poor and working-
class tenants vulnerable to displacement.  In the context of a decades-
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[https://perma.cc/4WCE-FMQ4]. 
 168. See generally Evictions, N.Y.C. COUNCIL (2018), 
https://council.nyc.gov/public-advocate/evictions/ [https://perma.cc/BHV6-3BYR]. 
 169. See STEIN, supra note 15, at 96–97. 
 170. See generally Stein, supra note 20. 
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been particularly pronounced for both regulated and unregulated 
tenants. 
In terms of the theory of gentrification elaborated in Section I.C,171 
the results of the market-based approach are predictable.  According 
to Smith: 
[O]nce the rich arrive, rent gaps will appear in the surrounding area; 
landlords will seek to close them through rent hikes and evictions; 
neighborhood stores will close; more working class people will be 
displaced by gentrification than will ever be housed in the new 
inclusionary complexes; a few somewhat-affordable apartments will 
be built in neighborhoods that are suddenly and severely 
transformed.172 
These dynamics are unfolding in gentrifying neighborhoods 
throughout New York City, including neighborhoods severely 
impacted by the targeted austerity of the post fiscal-crisis period, 
described in the previous Section, underscoring the point that state 
policies can function to devalorize urban space in one historical 
moment and in a subsequent moment can act to revalorize it.  
Overall, the union of state and market forces that are driving up land 
values attests to the structural basis of the affordable housing crisis.  
The latter has been facilitated by legal and policy initiatives — made 
possible by the city’s neoliberal restructuring in the 1970s — that have 
intensified housing’s commodification, elevating its value as real 
estate above its value as home. 
II. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND CRITIQUES OF LEGAL RIGHTS 
“Rights function to articulate a need, a condition of lack or injury, 
that cannot be fully redressed or transformed by rights, yet within 
existing political discourse can be signified in no other way.”173 
 
When I began working as a New York City tenant attorney in 
2004,174 the right to counsel was a pipedream.  Virtually every tenant 
in Housing Court appeared pro se and nearly every landlord was 
represented by an attorney.  With my horizons extending barely 
 
 171. Smith’s theory of gentrification is discussed supra, Section I.C. 
 172. STEIN, CAPITAL CITY, supra note 15, at 99. 
 173. Wendy Brown, Suffering the Paradoxes of Rights, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT 
CRITIQUE 431 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002). 
 174. In my first job out of law school, I worked as a Staff Attorney in the Eviction 
Prevention Unit of Bedford Stuyvesant Legal Services (BSLS) in the Bedford-
Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn.  BSLS was a legal services corporation-funded entity 
that provides free legal services to low- and no-income individuals. 
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beyond my docket of eviction defense cases in any given week, I 
assumed that this representational imbalance would always remain in 
place.  I was wrong.  After a few years living and working in New 
Mexico, I returned in 2018 to a very different legal landscape in New 
York City.  The affordable housing crisis had reached a fever pitch, 
leaving huge swaths of neighborhoods nearly unrecognizable from 
just a few years before, and the right to counsel had become the law 
of the city.  Since my return to New York, I have tried to make sense 
of the right to counsel in the context of the city’s intensifying 
gentrification — to understand the forces that led to the right to 
counsel becoming law and to think through the limits and possibilities 
of this kind of legal right amid widening social inequalities. 
 
Part II of this Article explores the capacity of the right to counsel 
to intervene in New York City’s affordable housing crisis.  Section 
II.A examines the history and mechanics of the right to counsel, 
grounding its advent in the decades-long organizing efforts of tenants 
and their advocates.  Section II.B draws distinctions between the right 
to counsel in eviction proceedings and criminal proceedings.  These 
distinctions — which revolve around the right to counsel’s focus on 
positive substantive outcomes and its contention with private power 
— facilitate an expansive construction of the right to counsel that 
moves beyond the confines of Housing Court.  Further, they extend 
to mobilizations that target the structural forces underlying the 
affordable housing crisis, outlined in Part I.  Section II.C situates the 
right to counsel in the context of progressive critiques of legal rights.  
It addresses the question of how legal rights discourses can operate to 
legitimize rather than undermine structural inequalities, before 
turning to transformative formulations of legal rights that can animate 
countermovements for social change. 
A. The Right to Counsel — History and Mechanics 
In the face of crowded eviction dockets, a complex governing body 
of law, a stark disparity in legal representation between landlords and 
tenants, and an oppressive court culture, tenant advocates have long 
agitated for enhanced due process and fairness for tenants facing 
eviction.  As early as five years after Housing Court was created in 
1973, observers were already casting it as a failure in no small part 
because of its insufficient procedural protections for tenants.175  From 
 
 175. See Emily Jane Goodman, Housing Court: The New York Tenant 
Experience, 17 URB. L. ANN. 57, 59–60 (1979). 
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the outset, the Court was said to have morphed from a place where 
tenants could petition for the enforcement of housing standards into a 
tool for landlords to collect rent arrears from tenants through 
expedited proceedings.176 
The first legal arguments for a right to counsel in eviction 
proceedings entered the literature in the late 1980s.  In his 1988 
article, Gideon’s Shelter, Andrew Scherer grounded the early 
critiques of Housing Court in due process arguments for a civil right 
to counsel.177  Scherer based his argument on Mathews v. Eldridge’s 
property interest analysis to assert that a person facing eviction has a 
constitutionally protected property interest in their apartment that 
they cannot be deprived of without due process of law.178  Scherer 
argued that the property interest was strong enough that due process 
could not be adequately guaranteed without access to counsel in an 
eviction proceeding.179  This reasoning became the salient line of 
argumentation in subsequent literature on the right to counsel in 
eviction proceedings.180  To bolster their due process arguments, 
scholars marshaled empirical studies of eviction cases to show that 
legal representation in Housing Court resulted in better outcomes for 
tenants and a significant decrease in evictions.181 
 
 176. See id. at 62. Housing courts in cities across the country were falling short of 
their objectives as well. See Anthony J. Fusco et al., Chicago’s Eviction Court: A 
Tenants’ Court of No Resort, 17 URB. L. ANN. 93, 101 (1979). See generally Russell 
Engler & Craig S. Bloomgarden, Summary Process Actions in the Boston Housing 




 177. See Andrew Scherer, Gideon’s Shelter: The Need to Recognize a Right to 
Counsel for Indigent Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 557, 558 (1988). 
 178. In determining the amount of process due under the Mathews test, courts 
must balance three factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest through procedures 
currently in place and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and (3) the administrative burdens that additional or 
substitute procedural requirements would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
335 (1976). 
 179. See Scherer, supra note 177, at 563. 
 180. See Ken Karas, Recognizing a Right to Counsel for Indigent Tenants in 
Eviction Proceedings in New York, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 527, 544–47 
(1991); Rachel Kleinman, Housing Gideon: The Right to Counsel in Eviction Cases, 
31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507, 1508 (2004). 
 181. See Steven Gunn, Eviction Defense for Poor Tenants, 13 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 385, 385–86 (1995); Karl Monsma, 20 Years of Representation Before a Public 
Housing Eviction Board, 26 L. & SOC’Y REV. 627, 647 (1992); Carroll Seron, The 
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By the mid-2000s, the voices calling for a right to counsel in 
Housing Court were growing louder.  The legal arguments had 
cohered around due process, and advocates turned their attention to 
policy and logistics.  A right to counsel, they argued, would reduce the 
high cost of evictions to the city and individual tenants by cost savings 
on shelters and other social services required when people lose their 
homes.182  It would also soften the indirect costs of homelessness, 
including hospitalization for related physical and medical conditions, 
and incarceration for petty crimes.183  Supporters of the right to 
counsel further argued that it would help to preserve New York’s 
affordable housing stock by keeping vulnerable tenants in apartments 
protected by the state’s rent regulation laws.184 
The movement for the right to counsel received an infusion of 
energy in 2012, when members of the Bronx-based Community 
Action for Safe Apartments (CASA)185 launched a campaign to 
reform the Bronx Housing Court.186  In support of its campaign, 
CASA published a participatory research report, Tipping the 
 
Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in NYC’s Housing Court, 35 
L. & SOC’Y REV. 419, 419–20 (2001). 
 182. See Raymond Brescia, Sheltering Counsel: Towards a Right to a Lawyer, 25 
TOURO L. REV. 187, 236 (2009); Andrew Scherer, Why People Who Face Losing 
Their Homes in Legal Proceedings Must Have a Right to Counsel, 3 CARDOZO PUB. 
L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 699, 711 (2006). 
 183. See Gee, supra note 45, at 97. 
 184. See Scherer, supra note 182, at 707. 
 185. According to CASA: 
Community Action for Safe Apartments (CASA) is New Settlement 
Apartments’ housing organizing initiative. CASA began in 2005, out of the 
need in the community to improve the poor housing conditions that persist 
for many families in our densely populated and underserved area of the 
Southwest Bronx. CASA is made up of community residents who work 
together to improve the living conditions in our neighborhood and maintain 
affordable housing through collective action. CASA’s multifaceted work 
combines building-specific efforts to improve housing conditions with 
neighborhood-wide campaigns focused on tenants’ rights to a safe, healthy 
and stable home. CASA also heavily participates in the work of other 
coalitions that advocate for legislation to preserve affordable housing and 
better protect tenants. 
CMTY. ACTION FOR SAFE APARTMENTS & CMTY. DEV. PROJECT, TIPPING THE SCALES: 
A REPORT OF TENANT EXPERIENCES IN BRONX HOUSING COURT, at i (2013), 
https://cdp.urbanjustice.org/sites/default/files/CDP.WEB.doc_Report_CASA-
TippingScales-full_201303.pdf [https://perma.cc/BYC4-PGUU]. 
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Scales,187 written from the perspective of low-income tenants at risk 
of eviction.  Unsurprisingly, the report found that, in many respects, 
Housing Court overwhelmingly favored landlords — from the 
disparity in legal representation188 to byzantine rules and 
procedures.189  The report concluded with a list of recommendations 
to improve the Bronx Housing Court, including establishing a right to 
counsel.190 
In 2014, the right to counsel moved closer to political reality.  That 
year, New York City Councilmembers Mark Levine and Vanessa 
Gibson introduced Intro 214-B, local legislation that required the city 
to provide low-income tenants with representation in eviction 
proceedings.191  At around the same time, a number of city-wide 
tenant advocacy organizations, tenants, academics, and legal services 
providers came together to form the Right to Counsel (RTC) 
Coalition.  According to the group’s website, the RTC Coalition is 
“rooted in principles of equity, humanity, diversity and justice that 
honored the advocates and attorneys and tenant organizing groups 
who had been working on this issue for decades while re-igniting the 
urgency to finally make it happen.”192  The RTC Coalition drew from 
a long history of tenant advocacy concerning the uneven playing field 
in Housing Court, embarking on a multi-pronged organizing 
campaign to win public support for a right to counsel.193 
While the RTC Coalition was organizing for the right to counsel, 
the de Blasio administration was dramatically increasing funding for 
eviction defense legal services.  Between 2013 and 2016, funding for 
tenant-side legal services increased from $6 million to $62 million.194  
 
 187. CMTY. ACTION FOR SAFE APARTMENTS, supra note 185, at ii–iv. 
 188. The disparity in legal representation between landlords and tenants in housing 
court is discussed supra Section I.A. 
 189. See generally CMTY. ACTION FOR SAFE APARTMENTS, supra note 185. 
 190. See id. at 23–24. 
 191. See RIGHT TO COUNSEL NYC COALITION, supra note 186, at 1. 
 192. Id. 
 193. The RTC Coalition’s efforts included: organizing a daylong forum on right to 
counsel at New York Law School and a follow-up report entitled “What the Experts 
Are Saying”; holding a series of town hall events for tenants in four of the city’s five 
boroughs; developing an implementation plan for right to counsel; gathering 
signatures on a petition to the Mayor and the City Council Speaker in support of 
right to counsel; making presentations to community boards throughout the city; and 
holding rallies and press conferences. See id. at 2–3. 
 194. See Jimmy Tobias, These Cities Are About to Make it Harder for Landlords 
to Evict People, NATION (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/these-
cities-are-about-to-make-it-harder-for-landlords-to-evict-people/ 
[https://perma.cc/WGN7-J2NT]. 
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In 2017, the right to counsel became law with the passage of Intro 
214-B by the New York City Council.  Intro 214-B commits $155 
million over a period of five years195 to ensure full legal 
representation for income-eligible respondents in eviction 
proceedings and limited legal services for other tenant-respondents.196  
The guarantee of full legal representation for income-eligible 
tenants197 covers “ongoing legal representation . . . and all advice, 
advocacy, and assistance associated with the 
representation . . . including, but not limited to, filing a notice of 
appearance in [the relevant eviction proceeding].”198  In effect, under 
Intro 214-B, every poor person being evicted from private housing in 
New York City is legally entitled to free, full representation by an 
attorney in Housing Court.199 
B. Distinguishing the Right to Counsel in Housing Court from 
Gideon 
There are clear parallels between the rationale for the right to 
counsel in eviction proceedings and criminal proceedings, the latter 
 
 195. See Kriston Capps, Ensures Right to Counsel for All Eviction Cases, 
CITYLAB (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/08/nyc-ensures-
eviction-lawyer-for-every-tenant/536508/ [https://perma.cc/7E2K-SWLQ]. 
 196. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-1301 (2017). 
 197. Income eligibility is defined as annual gross household income at or below 
200% of the federal poverty guidelines. See id. 
 198. Sabbeth, supra note 46, at 82. 
 199. Despite this guarantee, there remains some dispute as to whether the right to 
counsel in Housing Court is actually a right at all. This is manifest in the difference in 
the way the right to counsel is characterized by activists and organizers on the one 
hand and by politicians on the other. Organizers pushed for a right to counsel in 
public forums and advocated for it using that term, but as Intro 214-B worked its way 
toward passage, its political sponsors almost exclusively referred to its protections as 
“universal access” rather than as a right. The language of Intro 214-B itself reflects 
this hedging in two places in particular. First, subsection (a) opens with the words 
“subject to appropriation,” indicating that the services provided are subject to the 
availability of funds. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-1302(a) (2017). Second, subsection 
(g) states that “[n]othing in this chapter or the administration or application thereof 
shall be construed to create a private right of action on the part of any person or 
entity against the city or any agency, official, or employee thereof.” Id. § 26-1302(g). 
This language precludes any tenant action to compel the city to provide an attorney 
in Housing Court should the city fail to do so for whatever reason. While the 
significance of the characterization of the right to counsel — as a right or as 
something less than that — is a subject worth exploring, it is beyond the scope of this 
Article. This Article follows the lead of the tenant advocacy community as well as 
recent legal scholarship and uses the term right to counsel, as that characterization 
accurately reflects the content and functionality of the law, notwithstanding the 
above-mentioned limitations. See Sabbeth, supra note 46. 
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established by the Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainright.200  The 
life-altering consequences of eviction include the loss of one’s home 
and community ties, homelessness, employment hardship, adverse 
effects on children who change schools, and more.201  These 
consequences are so severe that they trigger a right to legal 
representation, just as the potential deprivation of liberty does in 
criminal legal proceedings.202  Further, both the right to counsel in 
criminal proceedings and in Housing Court are rooted in dignitary 
considerations, as it is widely held that access to an attorney increases 
the likelihood that a litigant will be heard and treated fairly when 
appearing before a tribunal.203 
But there are critical distinctions between the right to counsel in 
criminal proceedings and in Housing Court as well.  Kathryn Sabbeth 
recognizes that the right to counsel in Housing Court is unique in that 
it emphasizes positive substantive outcomes for tenants, as opposed 
to formal due process.204  These positive substantive outcomes include 
preventing displacement, decreasing homelessness, and preserving 
affordable housing.205  The municipal legislators who drafted and 
voted for Intro 214-B envisioned it as an intervention in the 
affordable housing crisis.206  Council Member Mark Levine, one of 
the bill’s co-sponsors and most outspoken supporter, made clear that 
the main goal of the right to counsel legislation was to address the 
city’s housing crisis by preventing evictions: “We’re here to address a 
crisis. That crisis is the threat of eviction faced by tens of thousands of 
tenants.”207  Levine added, “[i]t is going to be transformative . . . . It 
will entirely change the tenant-landlord relationship in this city . . . . 
The potential benefits of this are just massive.”208  Councilmember 
 
 200. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 201. The social costs of eviction are meticulously described in Matthew Desmond’s 
book Evicted. See generally MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT 
IN THE AMERICAN CITY (2017). 
 202. See Scherer, supra note 177, at 567–69. 
 203. See Alan Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System, 
in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS 130 (David Luban 
ed., 1984). 
 204. See Sabbeth, supra note 46, at 83–84. In addition to these distinctions, Sabbeth 
also notes the right to counsel’s impact on poor women of color, who bear the 
disproportionate brunt of eviction proceedings. See id. Further, the right to counsel is 
distinct from Gideon in that it was created by a legislative body, the New York City 
Council, rather than through a court’s constitutional interpretation. See id. 
 205. See id. at 85–88. 
 206. See id. at 87. 
 207. Id. at 85. 
 208. Tobias, supra note 194. 
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Laurie Cumbo went as far as to frame the right to counsel in terms of 
gentrification-prevention.209  Overall, there is little doubt that 
supporters of the right to counsel viewed it from the outset as an 
important tool in the fight for affordable housing and against 
displacement.210 
The right to counsel’s other departure from Gideon is its 
contention with private power, rather than public power.211  The right 
to an attorney in Housing Court cases initiated by private landlords is 
a tacit recognition of the high-stakes outcomes of eviction 
proceedings.  It is also an acknowledgment that private power — in 
this case, the power of private landlords and their attorneys in an 
unbalanced and oppressive court system — leads to evictions and 
contributes to the affordable housing crisis.  In this respect, the right 
to counsel can be viewed as a check on the disproportionate power of 
landlords in the context of Housing Court proceedings. 
C. Legal Rights Amid Structural Inequality 
The question at the heart of this Article is the extent to which the 
right to counsel in eviction proceedings can intervene in New York 
City’s affordable housing crisis, the roots of which lie outside of 
Housing Court, in the neoliberal restructuring — and subsequent 
gentrification — of the city.  Answering this question is challenging, 
as rights typically operate as guarantors of formal, rather than 
substantive, equality within the liberal legal tradition.212  That is, legal 
 
 209. See Sabbeth, supra note 46, at 87. Council Member Cumbo emphasized the 
law’s potential to curb gentrification and displacement: 
As a city grappling with gentrification and homelessness, it is paramount 
that we provide tenants facing eviction with vital resources such as the right 
to counsel to remain in their homes. Intro 214-B is groundbreaking 
legislation that could help curtail the displacement of everyday New 
Yorkers while preserving our socioeconomic diversity. 
NYC to Become First Jurisdiction in U.S. That Will Guarantee Free Legal 
Representation for Low-Income Tenants in Housing Court, BRONX BUREAU 
PRESIDENT (Aug. 28, 2019), http://bronxboropres.nyc.gov/2017/07/20/nyc-free-legal-
representation-housing-court-low-income/ [https://perma.cc/8HJV-GMQ5]. 
 210. According to Sabbeth, “[t]he Justices who decided Gideon and the cases 
leading up to it were motivated by a desire for substantive justice — they sought to 
protect African American men from abusive states operating under Jim Crow. The 
Justices, however, pursued their substantive aim indirectly and relied on the language 
and logic of procedure.” Sabbeth, supra note 46, at 62. 
 211. The right to counsel in criminal proceedings adheres when the state, rather 
than private interests, is the opposing party. See id. at 63. 
 212. For an overview of the development of economic and social, as opposed to 
civil, rights within the context of U.S. politics, see Frank Deale, The Unhappy History 
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rights by and large fail to disturb the structural arrangements that 
underpin social inequalities.  The political emancipation that 
theoretically flows from liberal rights regimes is located squarely 
within a prevailing social order that is highly unequal and stratified.213  
A narrow focus on legal rights in this type of context tends to 
individualize such inequality and stratification, and in the process 
legitimizes the status quo by failing to contend with how power is 
distributed in society.214  Wendy Brown has put this set of concerns 
about legal rights succinctly: “Rights in liberalism . . . tend to 
depoliticize the conditions they articulate.”215 
Scholars have applied Brown’s assertion to the interplay between 
the crisis of mass incarceration and the right to counsel in criminal 
proceedings.  In his seminal article, Poor People Lose: Gideon and 
the Critique of Rights, Paul Butler argues that an over-investment in 
rights in this context diverts attention from necessary political-
economic and racial critiques of the criminal justice system, as well as 
the critical solidarity-building and organizing efforts that are required 
to change it.216  In the decades following the Gideon decision, low-
income African Americans in the criminal justice system are 
considerably worse off than before.217  The reason for this is that the 
causes of the crisis of mass incarceration are structural and implicate 
the broader social and legal apparatus in which “poor people become 
losers in criminal justice.”218  In Butler’s analysis, the procedural 
 
of Economic Rights in the United States and Prospects for Their Creation and 
Renewal, 43 HOWARD L. REV. 281, 306–20 (2000). 
 213. See Brown, supra note 173, at 432. 
 214. See id. at 422. 
 215. Id. at 431. 
 216. See Paul Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 
YALE L.J. 2176, 2196–97 (2013). 
 217. Id. at 2178. 
 218. Id. at 2183–85. Butler breaks down mass incarceration’s “process of control” 
into five elements: 
1) The spaces that poor people, especially poor African Americans, live in 
receive more law enforcement in the form of police stops and arrests. 2) The 
criminal law deliberately ignores the social conditions that breed some 
forms of law-breaking. Deprivations associated with poverty are usually not 
“defenses” to criminal liability, although they may be factors considered in 
sentencing. 3) African Americans, who are disproportionately poor, are the 
target of explicit and implicit bias by key actors in the criminal justice 
system, including police, prosecutors, and judges. 4) Once any person is 
arrested, she becomes part of a crime control system of criminal justice, in 
which guilt is presumed. Prosecutors, using the legal apparatus of expansive 
criminal liability, recidivist statutes, and mandatory minimums, coerce guilty 
pleas by threatening defendants with vastly disproportionate punishment if 
they go to trial. 5) Repeat the cycle. A criminal case is created. Two-thirds 
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fairness guaranteed by Gideon obscures that reality, legitimizing a 
broken system and diffusing political resistance to it.219  What is 
needed to address the crisis of mass incarceration is not an increase in 
rights, but a social movement that takes aim at the material sources of 
the crisis and mobilizes for decarcerating reforms.220 
Following Butler’s critique of Gideon, a well-intentioned reliance 
on legal rights to address the harms faced by systematically 
subordinated people identifies those harms as problems but fails to 
grapple with how they are produced.  In other words, discourses of 
legal rights may name social harms as such, but they tend to leave 
intact the political economics and institutional conditions that 
underlie them.221  From this vantage point, a legal right, like the one 
derived from Gideon, targets inequities in the criminal justice system 
and, in the process, brings about concrete and meaningful benefits for 
subordinated individuals.  A guarantee of a defense attorney when 
the state is threatening one’s liberty is no small thing, but it fails to 
address the material conditions — like race and class inequality in a 
deindustrialized economy, targeted austerity, particular modes of 
policing, prosecution, and sentencing — that have driven the crisis of 
mass incarceration.222 
This is not to say, however, that a discourse of rights cannot play a 
significant role in the formation of a radically democratic and 
transformative political project.223  As Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw 
 
of freed prisoners are rearrested, and half return to prison, within three 
years of their release. 
Id. 
 219. See id. at 2178. 
 220. See generally Steven Zeidman, Several Roads to Decarceration, All of Which 
Should Be Taken, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Dec. 6, 2018), 
https://www.gothamgazette.com/opinion/8123-several-roads-to-decarceration-all-of-
which-should-be-taken [https://perma.cc/Z54K-245G]. Decarceration describes 
strategies for reducing the number of people who are sent to prison “with the 
ultimate aim of dismantling the prison system as the dominant mode of punishment.” 
ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 110 (2003). 
 221. See Brown, supra note 173, at 431–32. 
 222. Ruth Wilson Gilmore addresses these conditions in Golden Gulag, which 
analyzes the political and economic forces that have come together to produce 
California’s prison boom. Gilmore examines how prison expansion developed from 
surpluses of finance capital, labor, land, and state capacity. She argues that defeats of 
radical political struggles and the labor movement, as well as shifting patterns of 
capital investment, set the stage for prison growth. This process has resulted in a vast 
and expensive prison system, a huge number of incarcerated poor people and people 
of color, and the intensification of punitive paradigms of justice. See generally RUTH 
WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN 
GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA (2007). 
 223. See Brown, supra note 173, at 20. 
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has persuasively argued, social movements have deployed legal rights 
as a central organizing feature, insofar as the use of a rhetoric of 
rights becomes a potent movement-building act for people who have 
been constructed as right-less.224  In addition to rights signaling a 
sense of belonging to those who have been excluded from the body 
politic, a discourse of legal rights can mobilize group action, as well as 
provide an agenda for group mobilization.225  The civil rights 
movement stands as an exemplar of this, as civil rights activists 
strategically deployed a framework of legal rights to help galvanize a 
political community — comprised of historically oppressed people — 
that was seeking to transform society’s governing values and 
institutions in relation to race, equality, and citizenship.226 
The challenge for advocates seeking to amplify the valence of legal 
rights vis-à-vis social movements is to formulate and deploy them to 
take aim at the structural causes of inequities and injustices, as Butler 
and Brown’s critiques suggest, and to do so in a manner that builds 
the collective power of subordinated people, as Crenshaw asserts.  
The concept of non-reformist reforms is useful in this endeavor.  A 
non-reformist reform refers to a kind of political demand that 
addresses social problems in a manner that is suggestive of 
fundamental transformation.227  This type of reform helps shift the 
balance of power between competing social groups and helps bring 
about a broadening of the popular imagination and the creation of 
new political formations.228 
For a legal right to function as a non-reformist reform, it must 
gesture towards a reorganization of the structures underlying social 
harms, and — at the same time — facilitate the collective 
mobilization of subordinated people.  In this regard, the project of 
 
 224. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: 
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
1331, 1365 (1988). For Crenshaw, there is also a strategic-instrumentalist dimension 
to a reliance on rights: “As demonstrated in the civil rights movement, engaging in 
rights rhetoric can be an attempt to turn society’s ‘institutional logic’ against itself — 
to redeem some of the rhetorical promises and the self-congratulations that seem to 
thrive in American political discourse.” Id. at 1366. Further, “[p]eople can only 
demand change in ways that reflect the logic of the institutions that they are 
challenging. Demands for change that do not reflect the institutional logic — that is, 
demands that do not engage and subsequently reinforce the dominant ideology — 
will probably be ineffective.” Id. at 1367. 
 225. See Guinier & Torres, supra note 24, at 2748. 
 226. See Crenshaw, supra note 224, at 1356. 
 227. See ANDRÉ GORZ, STRATEGY FOR LABOR 7–8 (Martin A. Nicolaus & Victoria 
Ortiz trans., Beacon Press 1967) (1964). 
 228. See id. 
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transformative legal rights is two-fold: it relates to the design and 
content of the legal right in question, for example, whether the right 
contends meaningfully with the material sources of social 
subordination and inequality; and it also relates to the way in which 
the right is interpreted and deployed by groups of people who are 
organizing for social change.  In other words, the contestation of 
material deprivation is, to some degree, sown into the fabric of the 
right itself, which calls into question the distribution of political and 
economic power in society.  Further, the right is amenable to being 
deployed expansively to build the power of subordinated people, in 
keeping with their lived experiences and political desires.229  A legal 
right that combines these features has the capacity to be wielded as a 
catalyst for social change. 
In determining how the right to counsel fits into this matrix, it 
should be noted that it is open to competing interpretations.  When 
interpreted narrowly, the right to counsel is individualized and cast in 
due process terms that aim mainly to balance the representational 
playing field in eviction cases and to ameliorate the more abusive 
dynamics of Housing Court.  In a court that is widely regarded as 
disfavoring tenants,230 the majority of whom are poor women of 
color,231 these improvements are welcome.  More cynically, the right 
to counsel can also be interpreted as an explicit acknowledgment of 
the social costs of the de Blasio administration’s economic 
development plan.  As the latter contributes to rising land values and 
gentrification, it produces displacement.232  In this framing, the right 
to counsel can be seen as a measure, taken by the de Blasio 
administration, to contain the damage wrought by its market-based 
approach to the housing crisis. 
 
 229. Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres describe the process through which rights are 
constructed from below, by people mobilizing for social change, as demosprudence: 
Demosprudence is not an adversary of jurisprudence. Rather it is an 
analysis of how social power circulates and finds its expression in law. 
Demosprudents examine the collective expressions of resistance (whether 
through counter-narratives or paradigm-shifting mobilizations) that test the 
democratic content of the formal institutions of lawmaking studied by 
jurisprudents and legisprudents. Demosprudence looks for the answers in 
the people themselves when organized as dynamic constituencies and not as 
isolated individual preference holders. We are most concerned with law and 
the meaning-making potential of mobilized constituencies. 
Guinier & Torres, supra note 24, at 2755. 
 230. See supra Section I.A. 
 231. See supra Section I.A. 
 232. See supra Section I.D. 
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Notwithstanding these points, as seen in the preceding Section, the 
right to counsel’s purpose and design are unique, facilitating its 
interpretation in expansive terms.  The tenants and advocates who 
organized for the right to counsel to become law have taken up this 
broadened interpretation, which takes seriously the notion that the 
right to counsel was intended to intervene substantively in the 
affordable housing crisis and to contend with the private power of the 
real estate industry.  Under this construction, the right to counsel 
connects with struggles to build the organizing power of tenants and 
to systematically address the material deprivations they suffer.  
Though these material deprivations often manifest in Housing Court, 
where the right to counsel is directly operative, their roots reside in 
the political-economic and legal forces that have furthered housing’s 
commodification in neoliberal New York City. 
III. TOWARDS HOUSING JUSTICE 
“What needs defending is the use of housing as home, not as real 
estate.”233 
 
In mid-October of 2018, I was invited to a meeting of the 
Ridgewood Tenants’ Union (RTU), a tenant-led, anti-displacement 
group based in the gentrifying neighborhood of Ridgewood, Queens.  
I accompanied three law students from CUNY School of Law’s 
Community and Economic Development Clinic234 to a legal training 
on tenants’ rights.  The training was held in a public square in 
Ridgewood, and the audience was an eclectic mix of longtime 
neighborhood residents, who were mostly older and Latinx, and 
newcomers, who were mostly younger and White.  Everyone in 
attendance was concerned enough about the increasing risk of 
displacement to devote precious time on a weekend to venture out in 
the cold, listen to our presentation, and share their stories with their 
neighbors. 
 
 233. MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra note 22, at 11. 
 234. CUNY School of Law’s Community and Economic Development Clinic 
(CEDC) addresses structural inequalities in New York City through legal support for 
democratic economic entities and neighborhood institutions. The CEDC employs 
transactional representation, strategic litigation, community legal education, and 
policy reform and works in the following practice areas: Economic Democracy, 
Worker Justice, and Anti-Displacement. Community & Economic Development 
Clinic, CUNY SCH. L., https://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/clinics/ced/ 
[https://perma.cc/2G38-FW2P] (last visited Sept. 6, 2019). 
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The training was unlike any I had ever attended.  While the 
location of the event — public and outdoors — and the racial and 
generational diversity of its participants were both notable, something 
else gave it a unique feel: RTU’s lead organizer, Raquel Namuche, 
began and ended the meeting by eliciting commitments from 
everyone in the crowd — “I pledge to support my neighbors” and “I 
pledge to defend Ridgewood.”  These commitments were not about 
individual evictions or bad conditions in a particular building.  
Rather, they were an exhortation to protect an entire neighborhood 
from the incursions of real estate capital.  Listening to the crowd that 
day helped solidify a conclusion I have been working towards since 
the beginning of my legal career: That housing justice requires more 
than a robust defense of individual tenants’ homes or targeted actions 
against bad landlords.  It also necessitates a collective project to 
defend urban space against the social dislocations wrought by state-
facilitated, market-driven gentrification. 
 
This Article has put forth the argument that the current affordable 
housing crisis is, at its core, an outgrowth of housing’s legally-
constituted hyper-commodification in the context of post-fiscal crisis, 
neoliberal New York City.  Part III of this Article examines the right 
to counsel’s capacity to strengthen tenant-led organizing for housing 
justice in this context.  Section III.A returns to the theoretical 
framework laid out by Polanyi — specifically, the concept of 
countermovement235 — examining the latter’s relation to 
transformative constructions of legal rights.236  It argues that legal 
rights can provide vital support for a countermovement for housing 
justice, to the extent they can be deployed to target the material 
sources of tenants’ deprivation and to assist in the formation of new 
political solidarities.  Section III.B focuses on the organizing efforts of 
the RTC Coalition, in particular how the right to counsel is being 
combined with redistributive rights, laws, and policies to strengthen a 
tenant-led countermovement that takes aim at the structural 
underpinnings of gentrification and displacement.237  Section III.C 
examines efforts to undo the neoliberal model of urban economic 
development and governance inaugurated by the settlement of New 
York City’s fiscal crisis, averring that such efforts must necessarily be 
 
 235. See generally POLANYI, supra note 8. 
 236. See supra Section II.C. 
 237. See supra Part I. 
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based in the prioritization of housing’s value as home over its value as 
real estate. 
A. Countermovements and Transformative Rights 
The intensifying commodification of housing in New York City in 
recent years is in keeping with Polanyi’s depiction of the process 
through which the market economy overpowers society, with 
catastrophic human consequences.  This Section focuses on how 
society mobilizes against the harmful effects of excessive 
marketization — for example, displacement, poverty, and inequality, 
— and how legal rights fit into such mobilizations.  As described in 
Section I.B, Polanyi concluded in The Great Transformation that 
marketization produces widespread social dislocation, which in turn 
provokes countermovements238 for social protection.  Polanyi 
referred to the entirety of this process — the erosion of social life by 
advancing marketization and the collectivist response to reassert 
social control over the economy — as the “double movement.”239  For 
purposes of this Article, countermovement refers broadly to social 
mobilizations and reform efforts that seek to re-embed the market in 
society through the imposition of the instruments of democratic 
governance over the economy.240  In this sense, countermovements 
necessarily involve a measure of redistributive equality, and, in the 
context of New York City’s affordable housing crisis, relate to the 
decommodification of housing in the name of a more equitable, 
accessible, and democratic city. 
Polanyi’s notion of countermovement is at odds with the neoliberal 
political-economic and legal framework that emerged out of the 
settlement of New York City’s fiscal crisis.  Since the neoliberal turn, 
 
 238. For Polanyi, countermovements are organic and collectivist responses to the 
social destructiveness of market forces, which themselves are legally constructed. 
They can take a number of forms and can be politically regressive or progressive. See 
DALE, supra note 9, at 60. 
 239. See id. at 62. 
 240. See BLOCK, supra note 80, at xxxviii.  The concept of countermovement is 
related to, but distinguishable from, the depiction of social movements in the 
literature on law and community organizing. In the latter context, “[t]he movement 
has focused on fostering grassroots participation in local decision making, 
coordinating the strategic deployment of community resources to achieve 
community-defined goals, and building community-based democratic organizations 
led by local leaders who advocate for social and economic change.” Scott Cummings 
& Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 
443, 460–61 (2001). This type of movement may be oriented around contesting the 
harmful social effects of marketization — i.e. it may constitute a countermovement, 
in Polanyi’s terminology — but that is not necessarily the case. 
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markets have increasingly been walled off from state projects of 
egalitarian redistribution.241  This process is on display in New York 
in the removal of municipal home rule over key areas of social life 
and the subsequent diminution of the institutions comprising the 
social democratic polity, including rent regulation.242  
Countermovements work against such currents, aiming to restore a 
measure of humanity and social justice to the economic sphere.243  
Over the years, the signal achievement of countermovements has 
been “to empower the state in its roles as regulator of the economy 
and as guarantor of basic social welfare and a modicum of 
equality.”244  Historically, successful countermovements have resulted 
in significant social protections that have correlated with relative 
redistributive equality and increased democratic control over the 
economy.245 
An example of a countermovement for social protection is the case 
of so-called Red Vienna, the place where much of Polanyi’s analysis 
of the relationship between the market economy and society was 
formed.  Following World War I, Vienna faced a profound housing 
crisis, which prompted the government to engage in a massive, 
publicly-funded investment and infrastructure program.  This 
program included initiatives to expropriate vacant buildings and to 
tax wealthy landowners,246 as well as limits on real estate speculation 
and increased public land ownership.247  Through its newfound tax 
revenue, the municipal government organized emergency housing 
and built over 60,000 new apartments, which also served as an engine 
for job growth.248  Multi-story apartment complexes with green inner 
courtyards became the favored construction style.  These complexes, 
which were not run to make a profit, were connected to local 
infrastructure — like consumer cooperatives and schools — so as to 
 
 241. See QUINN SLOBODIAN, GLOBALISTS: THE END OF EMPIRE AND THE BIRTH OF 
NEOLIBERALISM 19 (2018). 
 242. See supra Section I.B. 
 243. SLOBODIAN, supra note 241, at 19. 
 244. Dale, supra note 9, at 61. 
 245. See Robert Kuttner, The Man from Red Vienna, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Dec. 21, 
2017), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/12/21/karl-polanyi-man-from-red-
vienna/ [https://perma.cc/5HRZ-ATYL] (reviewing GARETH DALE, KARL POLANYI: 
A LIFE ON THE LEFT (2016)). 
 246. See Veronika Duma & Hanna Lichtenberger, Remembering Red Vienna, 
JACOBIN (Feb. 10, 2017), https://jacobinmag.com/2017/02/red-vienna-austria-housing-
urban-planning [https://perma.cc/KT4D-4VRC]. 
 247. See id. 
 248. See id. 
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reduce residents’ travel and shopping time.  Rents in the apartments 
were calculated to cover operating costs and nothing more — in 1926, 
they averaged about 4% of a worker’s monthly wage.249  Overall, 
Vienna’s municipal administration intervened in the post-World War 
I economic crisis via a systematic effort to re-embed the market 
economy in society.  At the core of this state-led effort, which was 
backed by strong social movements, including well-organized workers 
and feminists, was the decommodification of key areas of social life, 
including housing.250 
Closer to home, New York City has a long history of tenant 
mobilizations and countermovements that have been connected to 
left political movements and characterized by a range of goals, 
strategies, and tactics.251  Intermittently — and particularly at 
moments of political and economic crisis — these mobilizations have 
intensified, coalescing around neighborhood-wide actions like rent 
strikes and eviction blockades, and provoking redistributive legal and 
policy concessions from municipal and state lawmakers.  In practice, 
though tenant-based countermovements in New York City have been 
heterogeneous and complex, they have historically been animated by 
the defense of the value of housing as home (for tenants) as opposed 
to real estate (for landlords).252 
The countermovements that have erupted episodically in reaction 
to the market economy’s destruction of social life — from post-World 
War I Vienna to neoliberal New York City — are connected to the 
discussion of transformative rights taken up in Part II of this Article.  
For a legal right to operate in a transformative manner, it must move 
beyond an acknowledgment of social harms and gesture toward the 
 
 249. See id. 
 250. See Kuttner, supra note 245. 
 251. In the earliest documented instance of organized direct action by tenants, in 
1904 the Lower East Side’s immigrant Jewish quarter erupted in protest against the 
neighborhood’s landlords, who had recently increased tenement house rents by 20–
30%. As a result of the tenant protests, which included a rent strike, the 
overwhelming majority of Lower East Side landlords rolled back rents to prestrike 
levels. The largest and most radical wave of tenant mobilization in the city lasted 
from 1917 to 1920, when a series of left labor-connected tenant unions formed across 
the city, pressuring the municipal government to pass the Emergency Rent Laws, 
which imposed price controls and provided some protections against eviction. During 
the Depression, tenant activists, drawing energy from left political parties and labor 
organizations, organized rent strikes and eviction blockades, leading to the adoption 
of rent control and the creation of public housing. See MADDEN & MARCUSE, supra 
note 22, at 156–62. 
 252. See generally RONALD LAWSON & MARK D. NAISON, THE TENANT 
MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK CITY, 1904 TO 1984 (1986). 
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reorganization of society’s fundamental economic and political 
arrangements, while at the same time facilitating the construction of 
new, emancipatory political formations.253  Polanyi devotes scant 
attention to the nature of particular countermovements for social 
protection or how they may be bolstered by particular conceptions of 
legal rights.254  But his analytical framework suggests that 
countermovements can be advanced by an expansive construction of 
rights. 
It is no stretch to say that transformative formulations of legal 
rights can help energize countermovements, provided these 
formulations call into question the material underpinnings of the 
harms they target and help bring about political mobilizations to re-
embed the market in society.  The following Section explores the 
ways in which the right to counsel is being deployed by tenants and 
their advocates in New York City in service of a growing 
countermovement for housing justice.  Ultimately, the right to 
counsel, in practice, is a piece of a broader reform effort that seeks to 
assert housing’s function as home and to diminish the power of real 
estate in the political economy of New York City. 
B. From Right to Counsel to Redistribution 
The coalition of grassroots groups that organized for the right to 
counsel to become law is in the process of constructing the right 
expansively to build the power of tenants and to push for 
redistributive and democratizing policy reforms in the sphere of 
housing.255  Susanna Blankley of the RTC Coalition articulates the 
expansive view of the right to counsel, describing its trajectory as 
follows: 
They [the tenants who organized for the right to counsel] . . . saw the 
courts as institutions that hold up larger systems of oppression, 
specifically white supremacy, capitalism and patriarchy.  They also 
knew that one of the results of a million New Yorkers experiencing 
 
 253. This resonates with Gorz’s notion of non-reformist reforms. See supra Section 
II.C. 
 254. See generally DALE, supra note 9, at 87. 
 255. See Susanna Blankley, The Right to Counsel Is an Important Victory, 
SOCIALIST WORKER (June 25, 2018), https://socialistworker.org/2018/06/25/the-right-
to-counsel-is-an-important-victory [https://perma.cc/5DLL-AC6K]. Blankley’s 
explication of the right to counsel points to the contingent and contested quality of 
legal rights. Although the latter may be authored by a court or a legislature, they are 
also subject to interpretation and construction by people engaged in collective 
mobilization and social change efforts. This resonates with Lani Guinier and Gerald 
Torres’ notion of demosprudence. See generally Guinier & Torres, supra note 24. 
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housing court, feeling humiliated, intimidated, powerless and 
patronized, was that the experience of court alone was either 
politicizing or an incredible deterrent to organizing.  Tenant groups 
in the Bronx and Brooklyn began campaigns to reform the courts, to 
reclaim them, but also to build tenant power and to remove a key 
tool from the landlords’ arsenal — control of the courts.256 
Blankley’s analysis moves beyond concerns over due process in 
individual eviction proceedings, politicizing Housing Court as a site 
within racial capitalism where landlords assert control over tenants.  
In this way, the RTC Coalition sees Housing Court as a piece of a 
broader political-economic puzzle that is structured by deep-seated 
power imbalances.  For the RTC Coalition, the right to counsel is 
more than a means to protect tenants from eviction, although that is 
important.  It is a tool to help subordinated people articulate a 
collective narrative of their systematic mistreatment by a legal system 
that favors landlords, in a political economy dominated by real 
estate.257  Through the expansive framework of the right to counsel 
that is deployed by the RTC Coalition, tenants come to see their 
grievances as commonly held, and they can consequently build 
solidarities that enhance their organizing capacity.258 
This enhanced capacity reverberates outside of individual eviction 
proceedings, contributing to the law and policy reform efforts of a 
broader tenant-based movement259: 
Tenants across the city who are part of the coalition, haven’t 
stopped organizing because we won this law — to the contrary!  
Tenants are organizing to use this new tool to build power and 
reinvigorate the tenant movement!  We need an entirely different 
social, political and economic system to meet our needs.  To win 
bolder housing demands in New York City that change the 
structures of power, we need a movement (organized and aligned) 
of hundreds of thousands if not millions, of tenants.260 
 
 256. Blankley, supra note 255. 
 257. See id. 
 258. Michael Grinthal defines organizing “as the processes by which people build 
and exercise power by collecting and activating relationships. These processes may 
come under the rubrics of community organizing, the labor movement, political 
campaigns and movements, organization of counter-institutions, etc.” Michael 
Grinthal, Power With: Practice Models for Social Justice Lawyering, 15 U. PA. J.L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 25, 34 (2011). According to Grinthal, organizing refers to “those 
processes by which power is created from multiplied relationships.” Id. 
 259. See Blankley, supra note 255. 
 260. Id. 
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In other words, the tenants who organized for the right to counsel 
did not stop when the law was passed.  Rather, the victory 
emboldened them, and they now stand poised to contribute their 
collective energy to further organizing efforts for housing justice that 
are redistributive in nature, aiming to shift the balance of power 
between tenants and real estate. 
The right to counsel, as it is being constructed by the RTC 
Coalition, is part of a growing countermovement to transform 
housing’s place in the political economy of New York City261 and to 
reverse the wave of legally-constituted commodification that issued 
from the neoliberal turn of the 1970s.  The current countermovement 
for housing justice is comprised of tenants and advocates from around 
the city and draws from a deep well of local activism.262  The right to 
counsel is bound up, theoretically and organizationally, with the 
broader tenant movement’s attempts to subject property to 
democratic and redistributive intervention, as evidenced by 
organizing efforts around the renewal of the rent laws in the summer 
of 2019.263  A number of the RTC Coalition’s members have 
spearheaded this organizing effort, and the RTC Coalition itself has 
supported strengthening the protections of rent stabilization.264  In 
keeping with Blankley’s above description of the capacity of the right 
to counsel to energize the tenant movement, the right to counsel has 
drawn in tenants who increasingly see their problems — eviction, 
harassment, lack of repairs, skyrocketing rents — as shared, the result 
of a structurally flawed system that works for the benefit of property 
owners.265  The right to counsel, in this framing, flows into — and 
 
 261. See id. 
 262. For a comprehensive treatment of the history of the tenant movement in New 
York City, see LAWSON & NAISON, supra note 252. 
 263. It should be noted that this theoretical overlap is reflected in the 
organizational overlap between the RTC Coalition and the coalition of tenant groups 
organizing to strengthen the rent laws, as a number of the same groups, including the 
Flatbush Tenant Coalition and the Community Service Society, are members of both 
coalitions. See Who We Are, HOUSING JUSTICE FOR ALL, 
https://www.housingjusticeforall.org/who-we-are-1 [https://perma.cc/7BEC-4RUD]. 
 264. A number of RTC Coalition members and supporters took on key roles in the 
2019 rent laws organizing efforts through the Housing Justice for All and No More 
MCIs coalitions. For a list of the RTC Coalition’s members, see About, RIGHT TO 
COUNS. NYC COALITION, https://www.righttocounselnyc.org/about 
[https://perma.cc/GDU4-FLUA]. 
 265. As Susanna Blankley, Coordinator of the RTC Coalition notes in an op-ed for 
City Limits, the community connection fostered through RTC is all the more 
important following the right to counsel’s implementation, as landlords shift and 
amplify tenant harassment tactics: 
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buoys — redistributivist efforts like the one to shore up the 
protections of rent stabilization. 
Framing the right to counsel as integrally connected to a range of 
tenant protections, such as enhanced rent stabilization, as the RTC 
Coalition does, recasts the right to counsel as a piece of what Chester 
Hartman called “the right to stay put.”266  The right to stay put is 
expressly based on principles of equity and refers to the right of 
tenants to remain in their homes irrespective of market forces.267  It 
is, therefore, particularly applicable to cities characterized by market-
based gentrification and displacement.  In articulating the right to stay 
put, Hartman notes that our legal system already places several limits 
— such as zoning regulations, housing and building codes, eminent 
domain laws, and rent regulation — on the absolute right of property 
owners to do with their property as they see fit.268  In places with 
rapidly rising land values, according to Hartman, a further step — 
such as strict just cause eviction and tight rent controls — must be 
taken to secure a right to remain for poor and working-class tenants 
at risk of displacement.269 
While Hartman does not include a right to counsel in this 
scaffolding of tenant protections, it is a useful and common-sense 
addition to the right to stay put.  New York City Housing Court, 
despite its original purpose,270 has historically functioned as a tool 
wielded by property owners to reclaim their assets, the latter doubling 
as tenants’ homes.271  As the discussion throughout this Article has 
shown, the representational field in Housing Court has been widely 
skewed towards landlords, leaving the vast majority of tenants to 
 
[T]enants need to be connected to members of community groups so that 
they can continue to organize against the various forms of harassment, 
intimidation, and neglect that landlords already employ and which are likely 
to intensify or adapt in response to right to counsel. Organized tenants can 
also connect to and build a larger movement for social justice because they 
aren’t just tenants — they’re workers, moms, elders — they are people, and 
organized people are powerful. 
Susanna Blankley, CityViews: New York Now Has ‘Right to Counsel,’ but Tenant 
Organizing Still Matters, CITY LIMITS (Nov. 27, 2018), 
https://citylimits.org/2018/11/27/cityviews-new-york-now-has-right-to-counsel-but-
tenant-organizing-still-matters/ [https://perma.cc/4YY4-5AHC]. 
 266. Chester Hartman, The Right to Stay Put, in LAND REFORM, AMERICAN STYLE 
302 (Charles C. Geisler & Frank J. Popper eds., 1984). 
 267. See id. 
 268. See id. at 307. 
 269. See id. at 312–14. 
 270. See Milton, supra note 40. 
 271. For a discussion of New York City Housing Court, see supra Section I.A. 
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navigate a complex legal landscape on their own.272  In this sense, 
Housing Court — as Blankley suggests — should be viewed as a piece 
of a larger system that operates to alienate and disempower tenants at 
the expense of landlords, against the backdrop of a rapidly gentrifying 
city. 
Reforming that system in a meaningful way requires a range of 
efforts, including the right to counsel, that, taken collectively, build 
the organizing capacity of tenants and decenter the role of real estate 
in the city’s political economy.  Conceiving of the right to counsel in 
this way — as rooted in considerations of power-building and 
enmeshed in a web of redistributive policy interventions on behalf of 
tenants — is in concert with how the right is being constructed by the 
RTC Coalition: actively using the right to counsel to build the 
organizing capacity of tenants, with the ultimate aim of reconstituting 
housing as a social good.273 
The right to counsel, in its expansive construction, is a component 
of a broader, transformative right to stay put that works against the 
grain of housing’s legally-constituted commodification in neoliberal 
New York City by affirming housing’s value as home.  The right to 
counsel is connected to efforts to build solidarities among tenants and 
to fight for policy reforms that place concrete checks on property 
owners’ ability to maximize the return on their real estate assets in a 
global, gentrifying city.  This framework resonates deeply with the 
theoretical intervention of Polanyi, as it springs from the premise that 
unfettered marketization in the sphere of housing produces 
dislocation and inequality, eventually leading to a countermovement 
for social protection.  In concert with Polanyi’s notion of 
countermovement,274 the transformative rights framework described 
here aims to turn back the harmful effects of marketization by re-
embedding the economy in society via democratically imposed 
protections against housing’s commodification.275  Grassroots 
mobilizations of tenants from around the city who see their 
grievances as collective, and their enemy as shared, are driving these 
efforts, which are animated in part by a constellation of legal rights 
that places a premium on housing’s social use.  The right to counsel, 
 
 272. For a discussion of the representational dynamics of Housing Court, see supra 
Section I.A. 
 273. For a discussion of how the RTC Coalition is deploying the right to counsel, 
see supra Section III.B. 
 274. For a discussion of Polanyi’s theory of countermovement, see supra Section 
III.A. 
 275. See supra Section III.B. 
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as it has been constructed by the tenants and organizers who fought 
for its passage, forms part of this constellation of rights. 
C. Towards a Post-Neoliberal City 
Strengthening rent regulation is a vital redistributive policy tool for 
maintaining a modicum of affordable and secure housing in New 
York City.276  But it is unlikely to add many new units of affordable 
housing.  When it comes to this task, society has been conditioned by 
the market-based common sense of the post-fiscal crisis era to resort 
to the kinds of tax subsidies and re-zonings described in Section II.C, 
initiatives that raise land values and incentivize speculation and 
displacement.  There are, however, alternatives to the market-based 
housing policy that has been a centerpiece of every mayoral 
administration from Koch to de Blasio.  These include robust public 
support for community land trusts, sweeping changes to the policy of 
inclusionary zoning, and the state facilitation of the transfer of private 
land to the public.277 
Adopting these measures would almost certainly require a 
fundamental shift in the thinking of policymakers.  This shift in policy 
common sense is summed up well by Samuel Stein, who notes that 
what is required to address our housing crisis is “changing the default 
actions for city agencies from their current objectives of raising 
property values and selling off land and buildings to another program 
altogether: disincentivizing evictions and decommodifying land.”278  
In short, this kind of policy transformation would require that our 
urban political-economic and governance priorities be turned on their 
head: instead of using the levers of state power to promote landlords’ 
right to extract rents, those levers would be deployed primarily to 
protect tenants’ right to stay put.  This framework would be explicitly 
grounded in principles of economic and racial equity.279 
Historically, dramatic changes in policymaking common sense 
occur when a vibrant countermovement successfully contests the 
social costs of excessive marketization.  There are currently signs that 
New York City is living through a moment of intensifying popular 
mobilization and ideological change around housing’s place in the 
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city’s political economy.280  Recently, in a kind of flashpoint moment, 
labor, housing, and immigrant rights activists came together to turn 
away Amazon, which had received an incentive-laden deal from the 
state that included $3 billion in tax subsidies.281  The defeat of 
Amazon was substantially related to concerns about displacement,282 
and can be read as a repudiation of the market economy’s domination 
of our society and politics, in the very place where some 
commentators have argued that the neoliberal project was 
inaugurated.283 
Around New York City — from Ridgewood, Queens to Crown 
Heights, Brooklyn — formations of tenants, most of which are led by 
women, people of color, and immigrants, are coming together to fight 
back against the real estate takeover of their neighborhoods.  Groups 
like the Crown Heights Tenant Union,284 Take Back the Bronx,285 
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and the Ridgewood Tenants Union286 have emerged to defend urban 
space against the dislocating effects of excessive marketization.  Their 
analysis of problems of eviction and displacement is rooted in a 
critique of housing’s hyper-commodification within neoliberal 
capitalism.287  These groups, through their everyday engagement with 
tenants at risk of displacement, are constructing a vision of housing 
that revolves around residents’ right to stay put irrespective of market 
forces. 
The emerging tenant countermovement of which these groups are 
a part is oriented around addressing the concrete manifestations of 
the housing crisis: evictions, rent increases, landlord harassment, and 
lack of repairs.  And at a deeper level, this countermovement is 
taking on the economic development and governance framework 
underlying state-facilitated, market-driven gentrification in neoliberal 
New York City.  This countermovement seeks to undo the laws and 
policies that have facilitated housing’s increasing commodification in 
the decades following the resolution of New York City’s fiscal crisis, 
and it seeks to construct a new kind of city — one that is first and 
foremost a home to its residents rather than an agglomeration of real 
estate assets. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article evaluates the capacity of the right to counsel to 
intervene in New York City’s escalating affordable housing crisis.  
Conceived in narrow, procedural terms, the right to counsel is limited 
to balancing the legal representational playing field in Housing Court 
eviction proceedings.  While this is a concretely valuable intervention 
that will benefit individual tenants, it leaves intact and may even 
legitimate the material sources of tenants’ economic deprivation.  The 
purpose and design of the right to counsel, however, lead to a more 
expansive interpretation, as its goal of producing positive substantive 
outcomes and its contention with private power gesture towards a 
challenge to the structural forces underlying the housing crisis.  This 
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expansive interpretation has been put into practice by the tenants, 
advocates, and organizers who fought for the right to counsel to 
become law, and who continue to organize for redistributive and 
democratizing policy reforms in the sphere of housing. 
The current housing crisis has its roots in the post-fiscal crisis 
neoliberal reorganization of New York City, which circumscribed the 
city’s home rule and inaugurated a mode of governance that has 
favored market-based solutions to social problems.  Seen through the 
prism of Karl Polanyi’s theoretical framework, the neoliberal turn has 
facilitated the increased separation of the market from society, with 
the dictates of the former overpowering the institutions of the latter.  
This process has been constituted legally — for example, by the 
diminished home rule powers of New York City and the subsequent 
hollowing out of rent stabilization — resulting in the increased 
commodification and inaccessibility of housing.  It has unfolded along 
vectors of race, class, and geography, with neoliberal state actors 
selectively targeting working-class, Black and Brown areas of the city 
for austerity in the years immediately following the crisis, then 
effectively revalorizing those same areas in recent years through a raft 
of initiatives intended to attract private real estate investment. 
Against this backdrop, a countermovement of tenants and 
advocates has come together to organize for social protection against 
the intensifying inequality and dislocation unleashed by decades of 
excessive marketization.  This countermovement is animated by an 
expansive framework of legal rights that asserts housing’s value as 
home over its value as real estate.  The right to counsel is a 
component of this rights framework, as organizers have constructed 
and deployed this right as a means to build the capacities of tenants 
who are engaged in a struggle for redistributive reforms intended to 
reverse housing’s commodification. 
This Article began with a quote from Langston Hughes: “I wish the 
rent was heaven sent.”  Hughes suggests, playfully, that salvation — 
the rent — comes from a higher power.  For New York City residents, 
it will come from everyday people organizing for a city whose 
development and housing priorities are socially driven, placing 
property within the reach of redistributive and democratic 
intervention.  The right to counsel, as conceived by the growing, 
tenant-based countermovement for housing justice, is vital to that 
task. 
